

Akdeniz University
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THE REPRESENTATION OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE GERMAN PRINTED
MEDIA AND ITS LINKAGE TO THE PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT TURKEY'S EU
ACCESSION

Joint Master's Programme European Studies Master Thesis

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
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THE REPRESENTATION OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE GERMAN PRINTED
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ABSTRACT

THE REPRESENTATION OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE GERMAN PRINTED MEDIA AND ITS LINKAGE TO THE PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION

This study aims to reveal that the German perception towards Turkey's European Union (EU) membership is in a great sense influenced by the relative share of the representation of the Turkish population in the German printed media.

In the popular debates about migration and integration of immigrants in Germany, the Turks are often at the centre as the largest minority group both in Europe and in Germany. To make this point comprehensible, firstly an overview of Turkish immigrants' situation in Germany has been given. Then, the significance of the media has been explained to realize how effective they are for the public opinion. As the next step in the study, the representation of Turkish immigrants in the printed media through secondary literature has been revealed. Hereafter, it has been focused on some title themes of the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* to illustrate how the 'otherness' of Turkish immigrants is constructed, where it has been found out that they stand out with failed integration and that generalization from individual stories to the whole Turkish immigrants is constructed.

To define the significance of the public opinion of both EU and German citizens for Turkey's EU membership, firstly an overview about Turkey-EU relations has been realized, upon which the German public opinion about Turkey's accession was analyzed. Thereafter the significance of the public opinion has been explained with the reason of a possible referendum during the time when Turkey has fulfilled all conditions for the membership and is ready for the EU accession. As a final step in the study, the linkage between the representation of Turkish immigrants in the German printed media and the opposition of the German public in respect to Turkey's accession into the EU has been clarified.

Key Words: Turkish immigrants in Germany, German printed media, public opinion, Turkey's EU membership. *Der Spiegel*.

ÖZET

ALMAN YAZILI BASININDAKİ TÜRK GÖÇMEN TASVİRİ VE BU TASVİRİN TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE ÜYE OLMASI HAKKINDA ALMAN KAMU GÖRÜŞÜ İLE BAĞLANTISI

Bu çalışmanın amacı Almanya’daki Türk nüfusunun medyadaki yansımaları ile Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği (AB)’ne girmesi hakkında oluşan Alman algısı arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya çıkarmaktır.

Almanya’daki göçmenler hakkındaki tartışmaların odak noktasını genelde Avrupa’nın özelde Almanya’nın en büyük azınlık grubu olarak Türkler oluşturmaktadır. Bu durumu anlaşılabilir kılmak adına, ilk olarak Almanya’daki Türk göçmenlerinin durumu hakkında genel bir bakış verilmiştir. Daha sonra medyanın önemi açıklanmış ve kamu görüşü için ne kadar etkili olduğuna değinilmiştir. Bir sonraki adımda ise Türk göçmenlerinin yazılı medyadaki tasviri var olan literatür kullanılarak ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunun ardından, Türk göçmenlerinin nasıl ‘ötekileştirildiği’ ni anlatmak için haftalık “Der Spiegel”e yoğunlaşmış, ve bunun sonucunda Türk göçmenlerinin başarısız entegrasyon ile dikkat çektikleri ve genellemeler oluşturduğu ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği yolunda hem AB hem Alman kamu görüşünün önemini ortaya koymak için, ilk olarak Türkiye-AB ilişkileri kısaca anlatılmış ve Alman kamuoyunda Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği hakkındaki fikirleri analiz edilmiştir. Sonra, olumsuz olan kamu görüşünün önemi Türkiye’nin AB kriterlerini yerine getirdiğinde muhtemel olan referandum sebebiyle açıklanmıştır. Çalışmadaki son aşama olarak, Türk göçmenlerinin Alman basılı medyadaki yansımaları ile Alman kamuoyunun Türkiye’nin AB’ye girmesi karşılığı arasındaki bağ açıklığa kavuşturulmuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Almanya’daki Türk göçmenler, Alman yazılı basını, kamu görüşü, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği, “Der Spiegel”

INTRODUCTION

Kein Volk ist uns optisch so nah; kaum ein Tag, an dem wir nicht in der einen oder anderen Weise einem Türken in Deutschland begegneten. Und doch bleiben sie uns fremd, fremder jedenfalls als Angehörige anderer Völker, die in Deutschland oder in unserer Nachbarschaft leben (Steinbach,1996:7).

Nowadays, international migration has become a main phenomenon worldwide and Europe has received a remarkable share of it. During the first three decades after the Second World War, northwestern European countries accepted and actively recruited migrants, although they did not intend to become immigration countries. Thus, it can be said that the common feature of Europe is its basic non-acceptance of immigration. Contrary to this fact, Germany has a higher percentage of foreign-born in the total population than the USA, which sees itself as a nation of immigrants (Penninx et al, 2004). In this sense, Germany also hosts the largest minority group in Europe, which is the Turkish population.

An enormous change in Germany is obvious if one considers that in the 1950s, Germany was, to a great extent, an ethnically homogeneous country. At that time, foreigners made up only one per cent of the inhabitants. Today, eight per cent of the population consists of foreigners, including those who, although they have a German passport, are considered persons “with a migration background,” in other words those for whom migration is part of a personal or family history. Within the population as a whole, every fifth person has a “migration background,” and among children under six, it is every third child. It is seen that the Federal Republic of Germany has become the “colourful Republic of Germany”. (Beck-Gernsheim,2009).

One can argue that a demographic transformation of such magnitude changes the very coordinates of society. German politics has reacted to the subsequent challenges in a variety of ways. The first phase of political reaction was characterized by not acting, since it was expected that the increase in foreigners was only temporary. Other than expected, instead of returning to their countries of origin, many migrants decided to bring their families to Germany. When it was obvious that for many, the time as a guest was turning into permanent settlement, the motto was still “We are not a country of immigration”, which obviously denied reality. After the reform of the citizenship law in 2000, which gave the right for territorial citizenship, the next phase has begun with the current government of Angela Merkel and it can be said that the new slogan is “integration”. Thus integration has

become the key word, which everyone refers to when the topic of migration is discussed currently in Germany (Ibid). Beck-Gernsheim argues that such general agreement may occur as integration is a term that allows many interpretations. In the media, politics, and in public, for example, it often includes a criticism of migrants, upon which the focus in this study will be on the media part. The author adds that sometimes in an unspoken undertone, sometimes overtly addressed is the idea that migrants are isolating themselves, even building up parallel societies and continues:

“They,” the migrants, need to change, must come out of their niches and work on becoming closer to Germany and the Germans. This perspective, even if it does encounter broad agreement, has a decisive flaw. It is one-sidedly fixated on the “other” of the migrants, on that which is unfamiliar and therefore conspicuous, and for that reason this perspective is unable to see what many migrants have already accomplished in terms of acclimating to German culture—and at a time when no one was speaking of integration (2009: XIV).

Coming to the specific case of Turkish immigrants¹ in Germany, they settled exactly 50 years ago to Germany as guest workers and their children and grand children were born and grown up in the country, constituting the second and third generation of Turks in Germany. Even after these 50 years, in the German public debates about Turkish immigrants, the focus is usually on their assumed integration deficit as mentioned above, with which the Turkish population stands out in the country. With its population of nearly 3 million² including also those who have become German citizens,³ Turkish immigrants present the largest foreign group in Germany and live mainly in areas with high industrialization as this is where the first generation found their jobs (Hochmuth, 2006).

As the first Turkish immigrants came from rural areas and were rather less educated, it can be said that this image also dominated for a long time the perception about Turks. With the increasing number of Turkish immigrants, the ‘Turks’ turned more and more into the character of typical foreigner or *Ausländer* in the public perception, representing all the problems attached to the immigration incident (Ramm,2006:174). Whenever the *Ausländerproblem* was addressed by politicians or by journalists, Turkish immigrants constituted the main object of attention (Ramm, 2010). Thus, it can be argued that Turkish

¹ In this study the expression of “Turkish immigrants” will be used for all Turks who have migrated to Germany and for those who were born and grown up in there no matter if they have become German citizens or not. Thus, the Turkish population will not be classified as “German-Turks” or “German with Turkish background”

² Migrationsbericht, 2008 and see: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-and-germany-celebrate-50.-anniversary-of-guest-worker-treaty-2011-03-16> (accessed on: 12.08.2011).

³ Between 1972 and 2002, about half a million Turkish citizens have applied and got German citizenship. For details see official website of the Turkish Ministry of labour at: www.csgb.gov.tr

immigrants are in a sense seen as the *Sündenbock* (scapegoat) in the country, responsible for all the negative aspects connected to immigrants. First appearing as guest worker and becoming than the foreigner (Ausländer) in the country, Turkish immigrants were also perceived through their religious identity as being Muslims especially after the incidents like 9/11 in the USA or the murder of the Dutch filmmaker in 2004, upon which it will also be touched in this work. The shift from the uneducated guest worker and foreigner into the 'other' on account of being Muslim is indicated by Casanova as:

The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic disprivileged "other" all tend to coincide. Moreover, all those dimensions of "otherness" now become superimposed upon Islam, so that Islam becomes the utterly "other." It is interesting to observe that only 30 years ago Islam was absolutely "invisible" among immigrants. Nobody in Europe "saw" immigrant workers from Turkey or the Maghreb as "Muslims." Today by contrast, all immigrants from Muslim countries are viewed as "Muslims" irrespective of their own religious attitudes (2006).

Thus it becomes obvious that the 'otherness' of Turkish immigrants was constructed in different ways with the time changing, but the negativity does never change. In this sense, the addressed themes in relation to Turkish immigrants in the media are usually failed integration into the host society on account of their cultural 'otherness', as it will be revealed in this study. Another point is that as Ramm also points out, on the account of the heterogeneous group of the Turkish population in Germany, their representations within the media do not reflect the reality about these people (2006). Instead, a generalization from individual stories to the whole Turkish immigrants is constructed. In this context, this study argues that the media plays a considerably important role in shaping the public opinion. However it should be mentioned that the focus will be limited with some examples from the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, as a broader examination of all media devices would not fit into the scope of this study. Coming back to the effect of the printed media, as Wellgraf points out, most of the German public's knowledge about migrants in their society is conveyed by the media (2008:8). The significance of the media increases if it is considered that on the one hand many Germans lack personal experience with immigrants and on the other hand that the mass media operate with stereotypical ideas and reproduce clichés. It should also be added that the German mainstream society's attitude to the migrants as a group is at the same time the view to the 'others' and 'strangers'. At the same time, the knowledge about immigrants' life remains primarily transformed by the media in Germany (Lüneborg et al,2011). In that way it can clearly be said that the media notably contributes to the representation and portrayal of immigrants in Germany (Appelius, 2009). Negative

and problematic representations of Turkish immigrants in some print media reinforce the public opinion to conclude that immigrants are sources of problems in society. Moreover, the problems of the immigrants are evaluated by the print media usually in relation to their ethnic and cultural status. Thus, one can argue that in the German media, immigrants are not regarded as individuals, but rather generalized as national, religious or cultural groups, through which the otherness of them is created. (Ucar-Ilbuga, 2006). It can be said that on account of the huge share of Turks in the foreign population foreigner or migrant is often equated with Turk. In other words, the crucial point is that the German public has the perception that the depicted failed integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany is on account of their cultural otherness, as it is reflected in the media. Thus, the opinion that Turkey's overall integration into the EU is not possible either appears. Since 1959 Turkey attempts to become a member of the European Union and has undergone several processes until it has gained the official candidate status, as it will be touched upon. However, on account of the high number of Turkish immigrants in Germany, domestic issues have dominated the debate on Turkey's EU membership in Germany (Mühlenhoff, 2010). In this sense, the significance of the representation of Turkish immigrants increases if one considers that this subject domains the EU-Turkey relations considerably. Thus, in this study it will be revealed that the representation of Turkish immigrants in Germany create a dislike in the German public towards Turkey's EU membership. In respect of this, reports of the European Commission will be used to illustrate the public opinion and the reasons for the dislike of Turkey's membership, where it will be shown that the cultural difference of Turks becomes strikingly important. Lastly to clarify the aim of the study, it argues that the negative representation of Turkish immigrants in the German printed media shapes the dislike of Turkey's EU membership in the public opinion.

1. Turkish Immigrants in Germany

In this part of the study, beginning from the arrival of the Turkish guest workers and the reasons why they came, until the current situation of Turkish immigrants, an overview will be provided, as this is essential to understand the context of their representation in the printed media, which will be examined later.

1.1 Arrival of Turkish Guest Workers in Germany

This year is the 50th anniversary of Germany's guest worker agreement with Turkey, which is celebrated in different ways in a variety of organizations. It was in

October 1961 that the labour recruitment agreement was signed and some 650,000 Turks came to West Germany. After the recession that followed the oil crisis in 1973, the guest workers started bringing their families to Germany. Nowadays the Turkish community in Germany consists of a population of nearly 3 million.

The German guest worker program was a response to a labor supply problem through which also the Turkish guest workers came to Germany. There were more open jobs than unemployed people and the German government found the solution by recruiting workers in the south of Europe. The institutionalization and expansion of the program in the 1960s had several reasons. One of these reasons was the high economic growth, which increased the demand for labor. Another cause was the foundation of the Bundeswehr. At the beginning it required 500,000 soldiers plus 200,000 civilian employees, causing a sharp reduction in the labor supply. The building of the Berlin Wall should also be mentioned as a reason for the expansion of the guest worker program. Until construction of the wall began on August 13, 1961, some 150,000 to 300,000 people annually had escaped the East German regime and come to the Federal Republic of Germany; most were in their early working years and quite well qualified. Cessation of this labor supply severely increased pressure on the labor market from 1961 onward. Furthermore, the expansion of secondary and higher education led to the fact that more people remained in school and universities, and this decreased the supply of available labor. The fact that the number of people aged 15–65 decreased during the 1960s as a consequence of the Second World War was another problem. The number of work hours per week was also reduced during this time. While Germans had worked 48 hours per week in 1950s, they worked an average of 40 hours per week in the 1960s. Due to these facts, Germany experienced a shortage of workers. Simultaneously in these times the economic forces were beginning to integrate and develop in Western Europe and with the closing of the border between East and West in 1961, so Germany was forced to seek manpower for its boom economic growth (Rist, 1978:90). Upon this, the German government initiated working force agreements with several countries in order to secure the economic growth and started with Italy in December 1955. After the first group of the so called “guest workers” had come from Italy and the next ones from Spain and Greece, on the 30th of October 1961, Germany and Turkey signed a bilateral labour agreement with general stipulations for recruitment, employment and wages (Hochmuth, 2006). The Turkish government encouraged migration, because it tried to alleviate its unemployment problem and simultaneously to improve its balance of payments by the worker’s remittances. The idea of the German government was to benefit from the

cheap labor and then send the worker back home when the labor shortage is over (Heckmann et al, 2009).

Thus, it becomes obvious that the guest worker program was conceived as a strictly temporary program in which new workers would rotate between their country of origin and Germany. It can be said that this view is reflected by the term *Gastarbeiter*, which means guest worker and includes by the term “guest” the idea of temporary stay. White explains the story of Turkish guest workers briefly as:

The first workers were recruited to labor-short Germany after 1961 and were greeted with some enthusiasm. The guest workers were mostly villagers, rural migrants with dreams of earning money and retiring to a small business and a secure life back in Turkey (White, 1997).

All participants in the program were convinced that this indeed was a temporary program. However, these parties have had different, sometimes opposed interests and perceptions of the program. Employers wanted cheap and motivated workers who could easily be laid off in times of a recession; guest workers were desirable for positions, mostly in industry, for which native workers either could not be recruited in sufficient numbers or would pose much higher costs. In many cases employers opted for cheap labor over investment in new and technologically advanced machinery. On the whole it can be said that employers took a rather short-term perspective (Heckmann et al, 2009). Though one could foresee that the reality would be different and these people would stay longer, as Castles and Kosack already in 1973 tried to draw attention:

Immigration and the presence of immigrant workers are of long-term importance for contemporary European society (...) even where there is a pattern of temporary migration - i.e. migrants coming to Western Europe for a few years only - immigrant workers as a group are permanent” (1973:6).

Most of the guest workers were single, between 20 and 40 years old and had grown up in rural, economically underdeveloped areas. The conditions of immigration and the treatment of the Turks in the first years are seen as one reason for the current so called integration failure. The first immigration stop was caused by the economic recession in 1966. However, the economy recovered and Germany needed more labor. In the period from 1967 until 1971, the majority of the new guest workers were poor farmers of East Anatolia. Consequently, the amount of Turks exceeded the one of Italians for the first time in Germany. After the Oil Crisis in the 1970s, Germany stopped to recruit new migrant

workers and made it more difficult to get work permit. However, Turkish immigration did not stop afterwards. Many migrants stayed in Germany because they feared to have to stay outside once they leave, on account of the difficulties in getting a new work permit. Instead of going to their country of origin, many guest workers let their families join them. Therefore, the composition of the Turkish population changed from the one of mostly male contract workers to a normal population with women and children (Orendt, 2010).

Coming to the formal process in this time and how guest workers stayed longer than planned, Teitelbaum and Martin explain that if employers certified that they still were in need of their Turkish workers after the one-year period expired, the work permits could be renewed for up to two further years, and the workers' families were allowed to join them in Germany. After five years in Germany, guest workers became entitled to change employers and to remain in the country even if they lost their jobs. The program proved very popular in Turkey, and the number of Turkish guest workers increased rapidly. While in 1961 there were nearly 9,000 Turkish guest workers, it increased to 66,000 in 1964, and then to 130,000 in 1970. Considering that migration would be temporary, guest workers were expected to rotate in and out of jobs on assembly lines, construction sites, or mines. When the economic boom finally waned and unemployment raised, guest workers, who lost their jobs, were expected to act as shock absorbers for European labor markets by naturally choosing to return home to take advantage of lower living costs there by. This so called “worker rotation principle” was first tested in Germany during the recession of 1966-67, and at first it seemed to work, as the number of foreigners employed in Germany declined, the German unemployment rate stayed under two percent, and economic growth and guest worker recruitment resumed in the late 1960s. Neither guest workers nor their employers desired strict enforcement of the rotation policy. The workers became accustomed to wages that were eight to ten times higher than those at home. Employers, for their part, had little incentive to send trained workers home and then pay to recruit and train replacements. Thus, the rotation principle was not really effective later. Guest workers who stayed often reunified their families in Europe, and thus the number of nonworking dependents climbed steadily (Teitelbaum and Martin, 2003).

1.2 The Indications of the Term *Gastarbeiter*

In this point it should be touched upon the term guest worker shortly and some views on it should be shared. Already in 1972 Delgado examined in his work “Die ‘Gastarbeiter’ in der Presse” the difficulty of the term “Gastarbeiter” and started his work

with the focus on this term instead of a foreword⁴. By using the explanation by Reding one can read in the preface of this work:

Die aus dem Ausland in die Bundesrepublik geholten Männer und Frauen wurden zumeist als "Fremdarbeiter" nazistischen Angedenkens diskriminiert. Sie wurden in der Bundesrepublik soziologisch, politisch und kulturell in Gettos abgedrängt. Sie wurden als jene Minderheit betrachtet, der man die Schuld an persönlichen und nationalen Schwierigkeiten aufhalsen konnte (quoted after Delgado, Reding, 1967).

Also Mandel thinks that the term is rather negative and argues that guests are bound to the rules and regulations of the hosts and that guests rarely feel at home in foreign places. The author continues by explaining that in the 1980s the term "Ausländer", meaning foreigner, began to replace the term "Gastarbeiter" emphasizing that its references are more existential, reducing persons to manpower, function, and temporal restrictions (2008). In this point the popular statement of Max Frisch can be mentioned: "We called for man power and people came" (Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte und es kamen Menschen). With cultural change, the guest worker was re-signified as a person, as a total being with feelings and culture as Soysal claims. In this way the Turk became "the other", whose identity was analysed in comparison with the German (2008:203). Thus, the existence of the Turkish guest workers was only through their manpower, as Mandel explains:

It is the migrant workers' potential manpower that defines their presence in Germany—originally a welcome nostrum to the labor shortage—and their absence from Turkey, content to export its under- and unemployment problems, receiving in return hard currency in remittances. Thus, for most parties concerned it is, as Max Frisch points out with poignant irony, and defines the migrants' presence in Germany (2008, p.56).

Furthermore stereotypically he was perceived with dark hair, dark eyes, moustache, as well as a place at the bottom, and he speaks as a member of the dispossessed and underprivileged (Soysal, 2008:202). Another aspect to be mentioned is that the term "Gastarbeiter" situated in the German language, but also internationally used, has become with the time equal with "migration" and "Turk". This is explained by Soysal as follows:

It has been almost a customary sign of credibility to make a reference to the guest worker when writing about migrants in Germany and Europe. Even those who set out to evidence the "changes" in the status of migrants find it hard to refrain from the practice. In our narratives, migrants, and Turks in particular, appear as perpetual guest workers, arrested in a state of cultural and social liminality (2003:493).

⁴ The book starts with the title: „An Stelle eines Vorwortes: Schwierigkeiten mit dem Begriff „Gastarbeiter“.

In this sense, Turks in Germany are also often directly related only to the working class, as the first Turks they met were the guest workers, who were often low-skilled, mostly uneducated and illiterate migrants, mainly from poverty-stricken rural parts of Turkey as mentioned before (Aslan, 2011). Thus it can be claimed that the Turkish guest workers mostly shape the image of Turks in the German public, as they were the first Turks they met.

All in all about the guest workers in Germany, it can be argued that the guest worker, whether from Italy, Spain or Turkey, seem to have performed a valuable function in contribution to the growth of the German economy in the postwar time. Also Legge mentions that the need for unskilled labor, high death rates of German life caused by the war, and the low fertility of the population, the guest workers filled many economic positions that were undesirable to the average citizen (2003:28). Rists' approach to the guest worker is that their existence is not simply a problem but that it represents a solution to other kinds of problems in economic life as well as to the transformation from a monistic unilingual society to a pluralistic and multilingual one (1978).

As a final word in this part of the study, Steinbach's comment about the guest workers agreement between Germany and Turkey can be given: "Die Einwanderung aus der Türkei ist ein Phänomen, zu dem es in der Geschichte Deutschlands und der Deutschen nichts Vergleichbares gegeben hat" (1996). This shows the significance of the Turkish guest workers for Germany.

1.3 Next Generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany

The Turkish minority in Germany arrived 50 years ago as mentioned above; some went back to Turkey and some stayed. Thus, their children and grandchildren were born and grown up in Germany. Nowadays Turkish immigrants with a 3 million population constitute with 25.1%⁵ the biggest foreign group in Germany, as well the biggest minority group in Europe. In this part an overview about their situation will be provided.

As explained before, when Germany invited Turkish guest workers in the 1960s, they were expected to leave later. However things were not as expected and many guest workers stayed and their families followed. During the recession of 1974/75 and 1981-1984, Turkish workers preferred to stay in Germany, as they feared not being allowed to come back (Schulze and Königseder, 2005). Starting in 1974, Turkish workers profited

⁵ Migrationsbericht, 2008.

increasingly from family unification as is their right according to the European Convention of Human Rights. It should also be emphasized that only one quarter of the Turkish population came actually as guest workers to Germany, while 53% immigrated as family members and 17% of the adult were born in Germany in 2002.⁶

Coming to the perception of the next generation of the Turkish population, one can say that the Turkish guest workers created in a sense an image of “Turks” in Germany. In this point Soysal argues that:

Into the 1990s, the migrant in Europe has been named “the Turk.” In public and private conversations of the journalistic, academic, and official kind, the opening “as the Turks in Europe (or more commonly in Germany)” has attained an explanatory inertia of its own (2003:500).

Considering the facts that these people came from rural areas and as unskilled workers without any high level of education, they were more representative of the less developed part of Turkey. In this context, the problematic perception of the Turkish immigrants in Germany is summarized by Teitelbaum and Martin as follow:

Turks were the last guest workers to arrive in large numbers, the poorest, the least educated, and the most different in cultural and historical terms. Their large numbers and low levels of income and education meant that Turkish migrants were more likely to reside in enclaves beset by high rates of poverty and joblessness. Their integration was also impeded by sharp differences between Turkish and European cultural views on the roles of men and women, by the deep significance of Islam in the daily lives of many Turks... (2003:105).

In this sense, Schaefer explains that it is the conditions under which Turkish immigration to Germany took place that make integration very difficult (2005). Thus, the emerging image of the Turkish population in Germany is explained by Mandel as:

(...) to take issue with many of the common stereotypes: they are flooding the country; they are taking our housing and our jobs; they lower our education standards; they are criminals; there is only xenophobia, since there are too many foreigners; they don't want to integrate; and they are “over-foreignizing” us (Mandal, 2008:73).

Having to face these perceptions, nowadays the second generation and even third generation of Turks live in Germany. They were born in Germany, speak the German language and accept these as a part of their identities. Despite the fact that Germany has been the land of their births and being the second generation, they are not therefore seen as

⁶ For more information see: <http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/7LG87X.html>

Germans. It can also be said that these people are more at home in Germany than they are in their parents' Turkish homelands, which they know only through pictures and stories or occasional holiday visits. To understand the dilemma of these people, on the one side by feeling at home in Germany, but on the other side not accepted by Germany as a component of this 'home', the everyday psychology that Turkish children living in Germany internalize derives from the politics and cultures of two nations, Germany and Turkey. As the descendants of guest workers, they occupy a cultural and political space that regulates them to the social and legal margins of both German and Turkish societies. Mandel points out that those children of migrant workers in many ways are victims of a set of systems stacked against them (Mandal,1995). They have been named with different titles. Some of them are second generation Turks, or the children of guest workers, involuntary migrants, descendants of migrants and "Gastarbeiterkinder" (guestworker-children). In this sense, White also explains there is a variety of vocabulary about how Germans referred to the Turkish population in the country and that it changed along with economic and political incidents. Thus, "Gastarbeiter" (guest workers) was replaced in part by "Ausländer" (foreigners) or "ausländische Arbeitnehmer" (foreign employees). The author continues to explain that a more politically correct nomenclature is migrants or "ausländische Mitbürger" (foreign fellow citizen) back in 1997 (White, 1997). Notably, as White observes, none of these names includes the terms 'immigrant' or ethnic, as that would imply the right to remain. In this respect, Wilpert argues that: "The Federal Republic of Germany does not recognize itself as a country of immigration, and thus there are neither first nor second-generation immigrants, but strictly speaking either migrants or foreigners" (1988a:3). Thus, it has been often claimed that Germany denied to be an "immigration country" and insisted on it and thus did not pursue any active integration policy (2010:8). It should also be mentioned that the place of birth was not giving rights of citizenship until the year of 2000, even if the place of birth was Germany. However, on January 1, 2000 a new nationality law came into force allowing for jus soli, the territorial citizenship and in this way non-ethnic Germans could gain citizenship through birth or long-term residence in Germany.⁷ It can be added without going into detail that after the naturalization of many Turkish immigrants, terms like "German-Turks" or "German with migration background" have also emerged recently.

The difficulty that the next generation of Turkish immigrants faces is also expressed by Teitelbaum and Martin. The authors draw attention to the point that while Germany

⁷ For details see: <http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/weekly/aa010800a.htm> (accessed: 02.04.2011)

made naturalization extremely difficult and stressed Turkish-language education even for German-born Turks, Turkey encouraged foreign-born Turks to think and act as Turkish citizens (2003:105). In this sense, the notion was advanced of a second generation ‘caught between two cultures’ (Ramm, 2006). With the political agenda of course also the debates about Turkish immigrants were shaped. After the 9/11 issue in the USA, the bombing attacks in Madrid in 2005 or the murder of the Dutch filmmaker the focus point was on Islam, upon which the Turkish population in Germany was also affected. While older images of Turkish immigrants emphasized their ethnic and cultural ‘otherness’ as foreigners, the increasingly heterogeneous German-Turkish community started to be reduced to the vision of a Muslim collective living in ‘parallel societies’ and ‘resisting integration’ (Ramm, 2009). In this sense Schaefer argues, instead of integrating migrants into German society, successive German governments have pursued the opposite policy. The result has been the emergence of so-called ‘parallel societies’, Turks and Germans living along each other, often without subscribing to the same set of values (2005). This so called ‘parallel society’ is criticized within the debates considerably, which will be revealed later in this study.

It is seen that the Turkish population in Germany was started to stand out with its otherness through their religion. In this context Kaya’s comment is that Germany creates discourses with religious aspects and perceives the ‘other’ through this. Furthermore he claims that the Islam Conference in 2006 was a strategy to describe Turkish immigrants through Islam (2009:14). Also Sosyal observes the outstanding position of the ‘other’ of Turkish immigrants and explains:

In public, popular, and scholarly discourses, Turkish migrants appear, at best, as relentless advocates of revitalized Turkishness or Islam, or, at worst, as essentially inassimilable agents of foreignness. Furthermore, this attribution of radical otherness, in cultural or ethnic variety, sets the migrants apart from public spaces in their country of residence, renders their participation invisible, and presents their situation as anomie” (Soysal,2003:493).

In this respect to the whole Turkish population not only in Germany but the in Europe, Casanova questions if these people can pass the unwritten rules of cultural European membership or if they are to remain strangers:

The specter of millions of Turkish citizens already in Europe but not of Europe, many of them second generation immigrants, caught between an old country they have left behind and their European host societies unable or unwilling to fully assimilate them, only makes the problem the more visible. “Gastarbeiter” can be successfully incorporated economically.

They may even gain voting rights, at least on the local level, and prove to be model or at least ordinary citizens. But can they pass the unwritten rules of cultural European membership or are they to remain “strangers,” ultimately “Fremdarbeiter”⁸ (2006:241).

In this sense, in the next parts of the study it will be shown how also the second generation remains as stranger in the printed media reporting. Having scrutinized the situation of Turkish immigrants after the guest worker generation, it should be explained which methodology will be used before focusing on the representation of Turkish immigrants in the German printed media.

2. Methodology

In this study mainly secondary literature will be used, whereas also articles from the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*, while also reports from the European Union Commission are going to be examined to prove the claimed statements.

To explain the significance of the printed media in respect to the public opinion secondary literature mainly about the media will be used, where the assumption of a negative representation of Turkish immigrants will be approved. To show samples of this, four title themes of the magazine *Spiegel* dealing with the Turkish immigrants in Germany will be examined. It should be emphasized that the time frames were not chosen with intention, but rather with the reason that they deal directly with Turkish immigrants in Germany. Firstly by giving the historical background of the date of issue shortly, the situation of Turkish immigrants in Germany will be realized. Afterwards the focus will be on the striking aspects of the article, where also the cover page and the pictures used in the article will be of interest. Another concern will be quotations from the text. In this way the attempt is to show how a negative image of Turkish immigrants is created and the construction of the ‘otherness’ is seen. Additionally reports from the European Commission will be used to illustrate the public opinion about Turkey’s EU membership.

3. Turkish Immigrants in the German Printed Media

In this step of the study, firstly in the general framework the significance of the media will be explained considering that it is mainly through the media that the German public perceives immigrants. Hereafter, an overview of the secondary literature about the representation of Turkish immigrants is going to be provided to realize which

⁸ The term *Fremdarbeiter*, meaning foreign worker, was used during the Nazi period in Germany

characteristics of them become striking, upon which four title themes about Turkish immigrants from the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* will be examined to realize the representation of them in the reporting.

3.1 The Effect of the Media on Public Perception in Regard to Migrants

In this part of the study it will be touched upon how the media influences the public opinion and how immigrants are in the general framework reflected within the reporting, whereupon the focus will be to the Turkish immigrants' representation. In that way it is attempted to show how the image of 'otherness' of Turkish immigrants emerge in the public opinion. Thus, in the later part of the study it will be tried to reveal how the dislike towards Turkey's membership is constructed.

The American humorist Will Rogers once said: "All I know is just what I read in the newspapers" (McCombs, 2004). This quotation makes it obvious that the printed media transfer the existing knowledge of the public. Früh approves this fact and argues that what people know about the world is learned through the media and he explains: "(...) mit dem Wandel der Informationsgesellschaft nimmt der Anteil an Sekundärerfahrung ständig zu. Den weitaus größten Teil, was wir über die Welt wissen, haben wir über Medien erfahren (Früh, 1989: 491). In this connection, Wellgraf explains that:

(...) Wissen basiert zudem zu einem großen Teil auf visuellen Vorstellungen, auf Bildern und bildhaften Imaginationen. Medien tragen zur Erzeugung dieses Wissens bei, sie liefern Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen, indem sie die Welt nicht nur abbilden, sondern sie immer auch ordnen und deuten (2008).

The most significant theories of the media effect are seen as agenda setting and framing. Without going into the details of the theories, Dahiden summarizes them in respect to the effect of the media as:

Beide Theorien können dem sozialen Konstruktivismus zugeordnet werden. Sowohl beim Agenda-Setting als auch beim Framing wird angenommen, dass die Medien die außermediale Realität nicht im Sinne des Objektivismus originalgetreu abbilden, sondern durch die Selektion von Themen (Agenda-Setting) und die strukturierte Präsentation (Framing) eine neue Medienrealität konstruieren (2006:85).

This clearly shows how the media constructs its own reality. In this context, Lippmann's significant work "Public Opinion" emphasizes as key problem that people take as facts not what is, but what they perceive to be facts (1991).

Recently the role of the media has been widely examined and discussed in relation with the media representation of immigrants (Appelius, 2009). One can talk about a consensus about the existence of the negative representation of Turkish immigrants in the media proved by many studies or context analyses in this field, which are not rare anymore. As a next step an overview of these studies will also be provided. The significance of the reporting about Turkish immigrants increases if it is considered that there is not a real acquaintance between German citizens and Turkish immigrants. In this context, Alkan argues that there is a dependence of people to the media in order to depict a picture about some nations, which would be in this case the Turks, as people are not in touch with the Turks at all, thus this dependence appears. He continues by claiming that people directly perceive what they get from the media. Thus, the image about a nation that a normal citizen has in mind is actually the image that the media has created and wanted to create (Alkan, 1994:27). So, one can talk about a dangerous provocative effect of the media as Butterwege puts forward:

Die Medien sind ganz entscheidend mitverantwortlich für die Erzeugung und Verfestigung ethnisch-kultureller Konflikte. [...]Die Medien erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass einer das Gewehr aus dem Schrank holt, und vor allem umzingeln die Medien den Schussbereiten mit der unübersehbaren Präsentation der immer gleichen Schießscheibe-dem entstellten Bild des Fremden bzw. der fremden Minderheit (Butterwege, 1999).

In this sense Cohen's argumentation : "The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963:13) would approve Butterwege's view. Farrokhzad also explains that the media generally plays a key role in the construction of 'the other or 'the foreigner'. Through the interaction of the fields politics, science and everyday life the media can have a huge affect on the consciousness of the public (2006).

Coming back to the effect of the media, it can be said that it is mainly through the mass media that the ordinary German citizen becomes aware of the migrants and perceives their existence and sees their own stereotyped ideas about foreigners confirmed. In this context Lippmann's view also supports this with his argumentation:

The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern the whole process of perception (1922: 90).

Thus, it is seen how prejudices can appear and this can be of great importance if it is considered that there is rarely anything positive to be read about foreigners in the press as Butterwege finds out (2005:91). Approving the famous quote "only bad news are good news", the media has exactly this attitude toward the Turks in Germany by presenting them (compare Butterwege, 2005). Thus, with the mood and longing for the confirmation of this phrase, it can be claimed that only nasty foreigners are good foreigners for the German media. One comment with regard to the overwhelmingly negative reporting of immigrants in the media problem is as follows:

The strategies, structures and procedures of reporting, the choice of themes, the perspective, the transfer of opinions, style and rhetoric are directed at presenting 'us' in a positive and 'them' in a negative way. Minorities hardly have access to the press and are regarded as less credible. Their cause is only worth reporting when they cause problems, are involved in crime or violence or can be represented as a threat to the white hegemony (Dijk, T.Van, 1993).

Wellgraf also argues that when we think about migrants, we usually have pictures about woman with headscarves or young man with gold necklace, hence only concrete pictures. He continues by explaining that the media absorbs these pictures and reproduce them in the visual image of migration (2008). In relation to this, Ramm argues that the widespread and repeated use of certain images in media illustrations of the Turkey debate serve as more subtle forms of religious demarcation. According to Ramm, these illustrations, minarets or women wearing head-scarves often appear as markers of religious difference (2009).

Another observation by Oliveri also reveals the negative reporting style within the printed media about migrants as:

Migrants mainly feature in news reports as victims of violence, as caught up in war, poverty and similar trauma, and as offenders. This links them in the public mind to the exceptional or undesirable, and the information given is often too sketchy for any real understanding of the situation (...) Such reporting tends to be Euro-centric, even if not necessarily ill-intentioned. Because they are seldom given a chance to speak, migrants, in the media, are objectified as a group and portrayed collectively and anonymously rather than as individuals, with the attendant risk of generalisations, clichés or blatant distortions that may go as far, in reports of assaults on immigrants, as to present the locals as the actual victims (2005:23).

Being significant names in the research area about migration and media, Butterwege and Hentges give a deep look into this subject. They criticize the media by arguing: „Durch

eine fragwürdige Wortwahl und eine unsensible, manchmal sogar unseriöse Migrationsberichterstattung verdirbt man das gesellschaftliche Klima“ (2006). Furthermore, Butterwege emphasizes that the position of migrants in the media is not active, but rather passive. In other words, the German media has preferred to talk about migrants instead of talking to them (Ibid). Another revision about Germany's mass media's attitude towards migrants concludes that a fragmentary picture about migrants is depicted and that too often the reporting about migrants is related to problem (Drossou, 2007). In this context, to explain the significance of the media in shaping the attitude towards people with different origins, cultures and religions living side by side Butterwege explains:

The media not only support (distorted) images of migrants and ethnic minorities that influence the thoughts of native residents, but also shape the latter' attitude with regard to models of people with different origins, cultures and religions living side by side[...]in particular, the concept of a “multicultural society”, which has been under discussion in Germany since the 1980s, has been commented on by journalists, (mis)interpreted and repeatedly exaggerated but not convincingly criticised (2005:94).

This clearly indicated how the multicultural structure with migrants is dealt within the media.

Another aspect within the media clichés is the difficulty to change them. In this sense the Turkish guest workers played a significant role. Alkan explains that already in the mid 1960s, when there were 150.000 Turkish guest workers in Germany, the first stereotypes about the Turks living in Germany appeared. It is remarkable that these stereotypes about Turks are still existent and reflected in the reporting about Turkish immigrants. This proves that it is easy to develop stereotypes, but tremendously difficult to abolish these clichés. (1994:134). These represented stereotypes in the reporting of the printed media actually shape the public opinion and the encountering of people outside the stereotype is directly ignored, which is explained by Beck-Gernshein as:

Von den zahlreichen Beispielen gelingender Integration nehmen wir viele gar nicht erst wahr, wir übersehen sie schlicht. Dies liegt zum einen am Alltagsbewußtsein, das vorwiegend ‘Abweichungen’ registriert und deshalb diejenigen Ausländer als Erfahrung nicht mitzählt, die nicht auffallen, nicht irritieren, nicht den Normalhorizont stören (2004:112).

To conclude this part, one outcome Delgado's study from 1972 shall be given:

...Übersteigerte Zerrbilder der “hilflosen, naiven und unauffälligen Gastarbeiter” sind in der sozialen Integration ebenso schädlich wie ungerechtfertigte Verketzerung. Hier und dort

bleibt die ‐Wahrheit‐ zwischen schablonenhaftem Denken und stereotypen Vorstellungen leicht auf der Strecke‐ (1972:128).

Thus it is revealed how the constructed picture in the media can be of great importance and the realities can disappear. Lastly it can be argued as Ehrkamp explains that representations of immigrant groups in the media, and in political and public discourses of host societies, are integral to immigrants' identity constructions, as immigrants internalize, grapple with, and often contest and challenge such labels and ascriptions (2005).

3.2 Secondary Literature Overview about the Representation of Immigrants in the Printed Media with the Focus on Turkish Immigrants

The representation of migrants in the printed media has become a focused research area recently. So, there exists a variety of literature about the topic migration in connection with media. A variety of literature about the representation of migrants, in the printed media, especially from Turkey, show that they are represented rather negatively.

In this point a short overview of the existing studies shall be provided. The representation of migrants in German press was for the first time systemically examined through 3069 newspaper articles by Delgado in 1972. The author analyzed 3000 newspaper articles from 84 newspapers between the years 1966-1969, where he found out that immigration was rather linked to criminality and supported the classical idea that the media influences the social reality. In this sense, it is emphasized that this study proves the fact that the undifferentiated and limited representation of the lifestyles of migrants bring a risk with itself, which is that prejudices become stronger against this group. To specify what the author has found out and show the image that has been shaped through the media about the Turkish guest worker, one quotation from his work can be given:

Der ‐Gastarbeiter‐ wird als ein ideales Beispiel des Ausgesto enen erlebt: Er ist aus Existenznot in die Bundesrepublik gekommen, ist in der Regel zu jeder Arbeit bereit, verh lt sich m glichst unauff llig, man hat ihn da nicht gewollt, wo er herkommt und man will ihn auch nicht, wo er hingekommen ist (Delgado, 1972: 92).

On the other hand Merten et al, in 1986 came to the conclusion that the Turks were depicted especially negative in the reporting and were often related with criminality, while Ruhrmann and Kollner in 1987 found out that the Turk became object to the opinion formation of ‐the foreigner are the Turks‐. Additionally according to Meißner and

Ruhrmann they are seen as a nation that is different and alien and are in great extent exposed to prejudices. (2007:7)

To give another example, the study of Alkan in 1994 can be mentioned, where he reveals that the guest workers are reflected as a foreign threat. Ruhrmann and Sommer also made a significant contribution to the researches about the representation of migrants in the media. They concluded that the media prefers always the negative valuation of migrants and ignore or neglect the positive review about them. In this sense, for example they found out that Turkish immigrant in the reporting stand out with their criminality. Furthermore on account of the selective and primarily negative representation on Turkish immigrants a distorted image is created, which can also lead to prejudices (2005, p.6). Additionally, Bonfadelli with his work “Medien und Migration: Europa als kultureller Raum?” concludes that the media often present foreign persons as passive and not actively acting persons and even if they appear in reports, it is mostly in a negative way (2007). The author also states that there is an underrepresentation of migrants in the media and furthermore he emphasizes the tendency to negativity in the representation of migrants (2007: 103). Also Trebbe points out that the “Turk” who has migrated is always associated with the Turkish guest worker stereotype, which is mostly an uneducated person from rural areas of Turkey (2009: 82).

Another survey focusing only on the Muslim women by Huhnke examines mainly how Muslim women are represented in the weekly magazine *Spiegel*, concludes that the Turkish women is represented through her long clothing and only available for her husband (1996).

Another new survey “Migrantinnen in den Medien” reveals in the general framework that firstly immigrants only appear at the edge of the reporting and secondly that their representation is stereotypical (Lüneborg et al, 2011). They also argue that the immigrants with which the receiver is confronted is described as follow: “Ob als Krimineller oder als (potenzieller) Terrorist, bei der Berichterstattung über in Deutschland lebende Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund rücken Konflikthaftigkeit und Bedrohung für die deutsche Mehrheitsgesellschaft hartnäckig in den Vordergrund“(Lüneborg et al,2011).

3.3 The Representation of Turkish Immigrants in *Der Spiegel*

In this part of the study, firstly background information about the magazine *Spiegel* will be given to make comprehensible why it was chosen to be examined. Later four title

themes from the magazine in respect to Turkish immigrants will be illustrated to show how their representation in the reporting is. In this sense the aim is to show how the ‘otherness’ of them is constructed and the focus usually is on the failed integration. The *Spiegel* titles which are going to be analyzed are the following: “Ghettos in Germany -One Million Turks from the 30th July of 1973, “The German Turks- Victims of xenophobia” the 7th June of 1993, “Germans and foreigner: dangerously alienated from on another” from the 14th of April, 1997 and lastly “Allah’s daughter without rights” from the date 15.11.2004.

3.4 Examination of *Der Spiegel*

The reason in choosing the weekly magazine *Spiegel* to examine the representation of Turkish immigrants lies behind the fact that it is seen as the Leitmedium in the German press and has an effective role. Thus, in this point some information about the magazine shall be illustrated.

The weekly German magazine *Der Spiegel* was founded in Hannover in 1946 under the name *Die Woche* with the help of British and Americans after the Second World War with the aim to give objective information to the German public after the war. Under the chief of Rudolf Augstein the name of the magazine was changed into *Der Spiegel* in 1947 and moved to Hamburg in 1952. The weekly magazine started with its publication by taking the magazines “Time” and “Newsweek” as an example model and is printed once weekly in Hamburg. It can be argued that with *Spiegel* the significance and power of the press was revealed. Each week subjects varying from politics to economics, from science to culture, from sport to media are included in the magazine making it one of the biggest magazines in Europe. It should also be added that *Spiegel* is a globalised news magazine splitting all around the world. The magazine became popular with its political scandal reports in Western Germany (Mora, 2009:118).

Der Spiegel is seen as a serious and believable magazine in Germany and Wellgraf explains about the significance of the magazine that: „Der Spiegel und seine Titelgeschichten nehmen in der deutschen Presselandschaft eine herausgehobene Rolle ein“. Furthermore one can say that that the magazine is seen as the most significant Leitmedium. The author continues by indicating:

Was am Montag im Spiegel zu lesen war, bestimmte über Jahrzehnte hinweg die tagespolitische Agenda der übrigen Zeitungen (...) Der Spiegel bleibt dennoch eine herausragende mediale Stimme, seine Titelgeschichten entfalten zudem eine öffentlicher Wirkung, die weit über das mediale Feld hinausreicht (2008,88-89).

In this sense, as Schiffer also argues, serious media can be regarded as especially dangerous, as people believe them in advance. Since it is believed that they stand for reporting without prejudice and in a comprehensive way, this leads directly to the acceptance of the presented report (2005:32).

Coming to the reader profile of the magazine, according to Deutsche-Media Analysis 5.91 million people are reading this magazine. The distribution of the magazine is made into 369 countries. Every week 1.436.709 items are printed and 1.038.739 of them are sold in Germany (Spiegel in Zahlen, quoted from Mora, 2009). To mention the profile of the Spiegel readers, it can be argued that it consists mostly of well educated people. While 49% of the *Spiegel* readers are following the magazine regularly, more than 29% of the readers have a university degree and 16% have an undergraduate degree (Mora, 2009).

If we come to the characteristics about the reporting style of Spiegel, one can observe that the transfer of the uncommented statements of individuals is a popular characteristic. The outcome of this feature of the magazine is explained as follow:

Auf diese Weise können (...)offen rassistische Sprüche abgedruckt werden, ohne dass die Autor(inn)en in direkter Form für ihren Inhalt verantwortlich zu machen wären: Sie haben das nicht gesagt; dies ist lediglich „die Stimme des Volkes“ (Wellgraf,2008:88).

More can be added to the features of the magazine as:

Für sie ist charakteristisch, dass Nachrichten über die Portratierung von Personen vermittelt werden. In dieser Form der Darstellung verschmelzen Nachrichten und häufig miteinander, so dass der Leser schwer Tatsachen und Werturteile der Autoren unterscheiden vermag (Ibid).

In respect to its style of text and picture combination it can be said that a chain of collective stereotypes are reflected to confirm the realization of the presented assumptions (p.96). Farrokhzad ascertains that *Spiegel* works with statistics to be regarded objective. For an argumentative support to the position of the report, so called experts about the subject are chosen (Farrokhzad, 2006:67), as it will be revealed during the examination of the chosen title themes.

As a last point about the weekly magazine *Spiegel*, Butterwege's comment is as follow:

Der Spiegel, as a leading publication, to a large extent determined the political climate. It took leave of liberal ideas on migration, integration and minorities' policies, ideas that

contrasted with the post-war conservative dogma that Germany is not, and must not become, a country of immigration (2005).

So *Spiegel* as a leading printed media in Germany tends to write with an attitude towards Germany's not becoming an immigration country and depicting immigrants, especially immigrants from Turkey, as 'other' and 'foreigner', which will be revealed in the next parts of the study. Wellgraf explains this aspect as:

In den Spiegel-Geschichten wird deutlich, wie zunächst alle türkischen Migranten pauschal dieser Gruppe zugeordnet, die Grenzen zu der deutschen Kultur markiert und ein Feindbild komponiert wird. Die anderen werden dabei weitgehend als geschlossene Gemeinschaft, als eine feindlich gesinnte Kultur wahrgenommen (2008).

Sosyal also thinks that the influential magazine "over the course of years would publish many panic-ridden stories of social, economic and cultural misfortune concerning migration and integration" (2008).

3.4.1 „Ghettos in Germany -One Million Turks“ (Ghettos in Deutschland-Eine Million Türken) 1973/ 31

The title theme of *Spiegel* in July 1973 is "Ghettos in Germany-One Million Turks" with a cover picture where a big Turkish family looking through the window of an old building is seen.⁹ In this way probably the miserable life conditions under which these people live is intended to be emphasized. Coming to the title story, it begins with the heading "The Turks are coming-run for it" (Die Türken komme-rette sich,wer kann) in a mood as if Germany would suffer from a flood of Turks and this statements should be perceived as a warning. In this context, one of the problematic issues about the media is examined by Ruhrmann and Sommer's study questioning if migrants were ignored or neglected or rather overrepresented with an exaggeration of the situation. They conclude with empirical evidences that the Turkish population in comparison to their proportion in the reporting was overrepresented, thus an atmosphere of a flood of Turks in Germany was created with popular expressions used like: "Die Ausländerflut" or "Das Boot ist zu voll" (2005:2-4). Thus, this *Spiegel* article confirms this opinion. It can also be said that in this way Turkey is perceived by many as being 'too big, too poor and too different' (Verney, 2007; Redmond, 2007).

⁹ For the cover page see: Annex 1

Starting with the historical background of the article one can argue that it is remarkable that, as Ramm emphasizes, it was published only a few months before the German government made the decision to stop the recruitment of foreign workers in November 1973, as mentioned before (2010:184).

Coming to the content of the article, it can be said it shows a deep look into the world of stereotypes with which the Germans approached guest workers from Turkey. The author of the *Spiegel* article puts forward that Turkish immigrants constitute an underdeveloped ethnic group (1973:26). The whole report can be regarded as a panic maker with a dramatic warning about the Turks. Another aspect of the article is the attempt to create an atmosphere as if Turks would invade Germany and Germany falls into danger, because Turks appear in the form of mass invasion or flood of newcomers (27). The reader is confronted with a picture of a group of Turkish guest workers at the beginning of the article and under the picture the fear that Berlin, Munich or Frankfurt are not able to cope with the invasion is expressed. Also the predictions of sociologists that ghettos would appear and in that way criminality and social impoverishment like in Harlem would occur is indicated. These issues are expressed in the article as follows:

Almost one million Turks live in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 1.2 million of them are waiting to enter the country. In the urban centres, already packed with foreigners, the crowds from the Bosphorus are intensifying a crisis which has been smouldering for a long time. Cities like Berlin, Munich or Frankfurt have extreme difficulties in coping with the invasion. Ghettos are emerging there, and sociologists have already predicted the kind of urban decay, crime and impoverishment seen in Harlem (quoted after Ramm 2010, *Spiegel* 30 July 1973).

Moreover the article is full of negative statements about Turks, like their eating habits, their bad understanding of cleanliness or the unsuccessfulness of their children in the education system as well as their involvement in crimes. All in all to the view of *Spiegel* Turkish immigrants constitute an ‘underdeveloped’ ethnic group (p.26). In a picture where Turkish children look at the camera, the title is: “Illiterate in two languages?”. This question brings the reader to think about how these people will live in Germany when they grow up and gives the message that the danger to Germany will come with this illiterate generation.

German’s attitude towards Turks is clearly given in the article with percentages. So it is reported that only eleven percent of Berlin residents see the Turks as “clean”, six percent as trustful, 60 percent of the Frankfurt residents could make a bad contact to Turks

or not at all and each second Berlin residents would not want any contact to Turks and lastly each seventh would like to live in a separate residential area (p,27). All these percentages show that Turks are not welcomed in Germany. Though this is not directly expressed in the article but rather indicated through the percentages.

The cliché that Turks are often criminal, which is seen in many other reporting as well is clearly emphasized in this *Spiegel* article as: “Wenn gestochen wird, ist häufig ein Türke dabei”. But as it is usual for *Spiegel* this is not directly written by the author of the article, but taken from an interview with a German policeman. Looking at all the pictures in this article, the reader is confronted with another world throughout the article, which is the world of the Turkish immigrants consisting of “Türkenwohnung”, “Türkenkneipe”, “Türkenladen”, “Türkencafe” or “Türkenviertel in Berlin” to give the message that their world is very different from the world of the Germans and they emancipate themselves in their own world, which indicates the so called parallel world and their unwillingness to integrate. In this way an “otherness” is created so that Turks are conceived as different from Germans.

Lastly one interpretation about this article by Ramm, where he criticizes it, should be given:

The article’s blend of cultural arrogance, indifference, open displeasure and paternalistic sympathy vividly reflects the perception which shaped the German majority’s attitude towards the guest workers and their descendents for decades. This attitude was at the same time the outcome of the specific German understanding of citizenship (Ramm,2010:185).

Thus it becomes obvious that this *Spiegel* article was considerably effective in shaping the public perception about Turkish immigrant, which was rather a negative one.

3.4.2 “The German Turks- Victims of xenophobia” (Die Deutsch-Türken-Opfer des Fremdenhasses) 1993/ 23

The title theme of June the 7th in 1993 of the weekly magazine was “The German Turks- Victims of xenophobia”. At the cover page we see a Turkish family in front of red, black and yellow flames.¹⁰ The Turkish couple with its two children is shown as victim of xenophobia after the Solingen arson attack. To make the context of this cover picture understandable, the Solingen arson attack in 1993 should shortly be explained. On the night of May 28 to May 29, 1993, four young German men with neo-Nazi ties, set fire to

¹⁰ For the cover page see Annex 2

the house of a large Turkish family in Solingen in North Rhine-Westphalia. So, in this fire three Turkish girls and two women died; fourteen other family members, including several children, were injured. The attack led to violent protests by Turks in several German cities and to large demonstrations of Germans expressing solidarity with the Turkish victims.¹¹ After the incident the fear that the united Germany could suffer a serious and permanent loss of images as a consequence of racially motivated attacks appeared (Butterwege, 2005). So one can argue that the main victim of the Solingen attack was Germany, with which the readers were supposed to identify. The difficult situation, with which Germany was confronted, is seen in the following sentences from the article:

After the murderous arson attack against Turks in Solingen, the atmosphere in the country is explosive. For the first time after the right-wing extremist terror the foreigners have fight back massively and as a mass. Bonn gets internationally into pressure. The Union wants to integrate Turks better with a new 'Ausländerrecht' (foreigner rights) (p.16,own translation).

The reaction to the Germans after the incidence is also mentioned with the sentences: "Dabei steht die Bundesregierung unter Druck. Im Ausland wird der tüchtige Deutsche wieder und immer mehr zum häßlichen Deutschen" (p.18). In this way reference is made to the Nazi time of Germany, where the image of Germans was harmed dramatically. The striking aspect here is that the focus is not on the people who have lost their life but rather the fear of Germany that their image will get harm like in the Second World War time "again".

Another aspect of the article is the argumentation of how unsuccessful Turks are in integrating to the German society. The article starts with the headline "Whether home, nor friends" (Weder Heimat, noch Freunde). In the first two pages of the article the reader is confronted with an intensive "otherness" depiction of Turks. Beside the burned house in Solingen we see four young boys who are praying with leaned heads. Under the pictures the emphasis is on: "Muslim Turks in Berlin, attacks target in Solingen".¹² In that way *Spiegel* points out the religious difference of Turks and one can think that is shown as a reason why they were victims of xenophobia. Directly in the next page a Turkish bell dancer and a guest worker in Opel are shown and defined with the sentences: "Turkish wedding (in Essen) and Turkish worker (in Opel): labour support, building society safer, Aldi customer"(p.17), suggesting that Turks are culturally different. Within the article this comment is mentioned as follow: "Erwünscht seien die Türken, so Politologe Leggewie,

¹¹ For more information see: <http://www.welt.de/politik/lachmann/article5581089/Solingen-Tuerken-und-ein-ewig-brennendes-Feuer.html>

¹² For the picture see Annex 3

allenfalls als ‚Nutz-und Schutztürken‘, als ‚Arbeitskräfte, Autokäufer, Bausparer, Aldi Kunden‘ sowie als Nato-Partner am südöstlichen Ende Europas” (p.27). Thus it becomes obvious that in Germany they are perceived through their labour support or their contribution with their consumption in the supermarket Aldi, which is the one of cheapest supermarkets and which is usually associated with Turks, but not as other participants of the German society.

The article also explains in detail the previous right-wing extremist events against the Turks, whereupon the fact that Turks live since years in Germany and are now in other positions than the poorly educated immigrants arrived in the 1960s and 1970s is also mentioned. While firstly it seems like taking a positive attitude towards Turks’ changing position in Germany, directly after these statements the inability of Turks to integrate is expressed. In this sense, the article clearly stresses that Turks are foreigners and are suffering under racism:

Ihre Kultur, ihre islamische Religion, ihre Gebräuche stempeln sie zu Ikonen des Fremden - sie sind die perfekten anderen. Und nicht nur für wenige rechtsradikale Gewalttäter geben sie das ideale Feindbild her; ständig sind sie Objekt alltäglicher Gewalt, leiden sie unter Pöbeleien, Demütigungen und scheelen Blicken (...)Vor allem aber sind die deutschen Türken das Paradebeispiel einer mißlungenen, weil nicht gewollten Integration. Sie blieben fremd bis heute, obwohl sie seit über 30 Jahren in Deutschland leben und viele längst keine andere Heimat mehr kennen. Wirtschaftlich sind Türken aus Deutschland nicht mehr wegzudenken, gesellschaftlich und politisch aber sind sie Parias (17-18).

This quotation clearly indicates that Turkish immigrants, even though they do not have any home except Germany as mentioned, were outsiders and are still outsiders in Germany. Only economically are they indispensable, but both in the society and politically they are seen as “pariahs”. In spite of the fact that throughout the article the difficulties Turks have to face after living for so many years in Germany are also presented, the concluding remarks are usually leaving a negative statement into the reader’s mind like in the following sentences from the article:“(…)sie reagieren nach der Logik des Ghettos: Die Ausgestoßenen schließen sich enger zusammen, versteifen sich auf eigene Werte und Traditionen; je bedrohlicher der Druck von außen wird, desto beharrlicher“. In this way the indication is again, like in the examined article above, the emancipation and otherness of the Turkish group in Germany. Another indicator for failed integration is shown with the education level of Turkish youth which is reported as:

Jeder vierte Berliner Jugendliche im Alter von 16 bis 20 Jahren ist einer Studie der Freien Universität zufolge Ausländer, aber nur jeder zehnte Lehrling ist Ausländer. 29,5 Prozent aller ausländischen Jugendlichen in Berlin haben keinen Hauptschulabschluß - die jungen Türken führen diese negative Statistik an.

In opposition to the failed integration of many Turks, successful integration is depicted in the article when one speaks barely any Turkish, breaks the Islam tradition, uses alcohol and eats pork, as indicated in the following quotation from the article:

Zu Hause sprechen die Haydars Deutsch. Sohn Güney, 8, kann kaum noch Türkisch. Auch Vater Cömert hat mit der Tradition Islam gebrochen, ißt Schwein und trinkt Alkohol. Längst integriert ist auch Cihan Batman, 24, Betriebswirtschaftsstudent aus Stuttgart: „Ich mag Spätzle und Kebab“. Vor zwei Jahren ist er deutscher Staatsangehöriger geworden (p.21).

A remarkable picture in the article shows a Turkish boy wearing the Turkish flag and also closing his mouth with it like a terrorist or fanatic in the middle of a “civil war” as the article describes it. Behind the Turkish boy a fire set and a group of young Turks are seen, creating this atmosphere of a “civil war”. This picture can be regarded as a provocative ambience illustrating how dangerous Turkish youth can become, especially after the Solingen arson attack.

Additionally, this article can be seen as striking, since it includes a comment of Rudolf Augstein, who is the founder of the magazine, what makes his statements momentous. By discussing if the acceptance of double citizenship of Turkish immigrants would be a cure for Germany, he clearly gives his statement against it on account of the fact that Turks belong to another cultural area:

(...) Sehr anders wäre das mit den Türken. Sie gehören einem Kulturkreis an, der mit dem unseren vor und nach Prinz Eugen nichts gemein hat. Hier kann es nur eine Entscheidung geben. Entweder, sie wollen Deutsche werden, mit allen Rechten und Pflichten, oder Türken bleiben, was ihnen ja freisteht (...) Es geht hier aber nicht um Deutsche und Türken allein. Man stelle sich ein EG-Europa à la Maastricht vor, in dem die Türken Dänen, Engländer, Franzosen oder Spanier werden könnten ohne doch in den Kulturgärten dieser Länder zu wurzeln. Eine Demokratie im Sinne der Maastricht-Länder hatten sie aber nie und werden sie auch in den 20 Jahren schwerlich haben (p.18).

It is seen that Augstein conceives the Turks not in the European area and makes clear if they want to become German, they have to decide either for the German side or for the Turkish one. Also Turkey's EU accession is rejected in this sense with the

argumentation of Turkey's cultural difference, which will be examined in the next parts of this study.

Another indication of the article is that Turkish immigrants are regarded as competitor rather than friends in the business world (p.19). In this connection Legge reminds that even though the guest workers were recruited as temporary during the 1960s, the Turks stayed, as the German government needed them during the economic expansion. However, the author explains that during the 1990s these opportunities began to contract. On account of that many Germans began to resent the Turks, as they thought they were competitors for German jobs (Legge, 2003, p.XIII). Thus, one can claim that Turkish immigrants are also perceived as a threat by the German public taking their jobs away.

As a last aspect of this *Spiegel* article, the part of the title theme ends with the sentence "Ihr werdet nie mehr unter euch sein" expressed by a Turkish activist. Again the usual style of giving the statement through another person is used in this way. This sentence can be perceived as harassment by Germans, which is probably purposed by the magazine.

3.4.3 "Germans and Foreigner: Dangerously Alienated from one Another" (Ausländer und Deutsche: Gefährlich fremd) 1997/ 16

Der Spiegel of the 14th April, 1997 was published with the title "Germany and foreigners: dangerously alienated from one another", which will be analyzed in this part of the study. With this title, the magazine declared that the multicultural society was a failure.

To give the historical background of this title theme and make it understandable, it should be mentioned that the concept of a "multicultural society" was under discussion in Germany since the 1980s. In this point it is worth to mention shortly that according to Rauer and Schmidtke actually the term "multiculturalism" indicates otherness. They explain their view with the argumentation: "...sei hier auf die ambivalente Bedeutung des Begriffs "Multikulturalismus" verwiesen- ein Begriff der zwar Pluralität bezeichnet, jedoch immer auch "Fremdheit" oder das "Andere" konnotiert" (2004:249). In this sense Butterwege claims that the multicultural reality of immigration society is also often purposely reinterpreted in the media to mean a threat to the indigenous population (2005), like it is done by the magazine in this article. Looking at the cover picture¹³, a woman with a dark complexion and swollen jugular vein waving the Turkish flag is seen. Next to her, girls with headscarves are sitting probably in a Koran school. Moreover, under the waving

¹³ See Annex 4

flag, young immigrants armed with knives are seen. One comment about this cover picture is: “In an act of perfidious journalistic exaggeration, *Der Spiegel* summarized the hegemonic phantasm of the fear of ‘foreigners: fanaticism, fundamentalism, crime and violence’” (Terkessidis, 2003). Another comment by Ramm about this article and the cover picture is that it can be regarded as an attempt to explain that the ‘ideal of a multicultural society’ supposedly failed, as the classical view on Turks in Germany mainly focused on their ethnic and cultural ‘otherness’, reflecting them as ‘dangerously alien’ (2006). Also Mora supports the idea that this cover page’s reference is to the Turkish immigrants in Germany and gives the message that they are not able to integrate and become like “us”, the Germans. Furthermore, she argues that flag carrying woman on the cover picture indicates that Muslim Turks are ready to conquer the country by referring to the prejudices from history¹⁴ (2009). Also Kaya argues that this cover page depicts Turks as people emphasizing their identity and religion, thus they become dangerous (2009).

Another aspect worth to mention is the fact that during my searches for this study, I recognized that in the online Spiegel archive, where all cover pages from the title themes and articles are available, only this cover picture of the magazine could not be accessed. Apart from this, coming to the source of these pictures on the cover page, there is an interesting anecdote to be stressed out. Again during the time of research for this study I contacted Ayhan Kaya, who is lecturer at the Department of International Relations, and head of the Centres for Migration Research and European Studies at Istanbul Bilgi University upon which he sent me his article “A political issue: Turkey as a political campaign in Germany”, which was a conference speech held in 2009. In this article the author explains that the picture on this cover page of Spiegel, where young Turkish boys armed with knives¹⁵ are seen, was actually made by him for his dissertation at a youth centre in Kreuzberg, Berlin. Furthermore it is indicated that one of these young boys is nowadays an important film director named Neco Celik and the other boy has become an actor. Thus, Kaya concludes that this cover page picture was especially chosen after the report was written so that the statements “Turkish youth have a tendency towards violence”, “Religion, ethnicity and Turkish nationality play an important role for them, so they are not able to integrate” would be supported. However, taking the actors of this picture into consideration, Kaya argues that the reality is different, as these actors are well integrated and participant in the German society and contributors to German art (2009).

¹⁴ Turks were seen as a shrewd and cruel warrior and a potent enemy to be feared and respected as explained by Teitelbaum and Martin.

¹⁵ See Annex 5

Coming back to the article, it starts with the title: “Zeitbomben in den Vorstädten” and shows a picture of the youth gang armed with knives alarming that:

Die Ausländerintegration ist gescheitert. Überall im Land entsteht eine explosive Spannung. Bei jungen Türken und Aussiedlern, Randgruppen ohne Perspektive, wächst die Bereitschaft, sich mit Gewalt zu holen, was die Gesellschaft ihnen verweigert“ (p78).

Thus, it becomes obvious that Turkish immigrants are seen as dangerously as a time bomb, ready to explode and lead to damage, as also later mentioned in the article (p.84).

The failed integration of Turkish immigrants is pointed out by comparing them to other immigrant groups: “In contrast to the Italians, Spaniards, Yugoslavs, or Portuguese, who were also brought as guest workers to the country, the Turks have always remained alien to the Germans, not only because of their religion and cultural traditions” (quoted from Ramm:93,2010). To the question what if not religious and cultural tradition can be the reason for Turks remaining alien remains unanswered. Directly after the quotation above, Helmut Kohl’s explanation upon his rejection of Turkey’s EU membership is included in the article. Kohl’s explanation that he has not learnt in his Geography classes that Anatolia is a part of Europe is given (p.93). According to these statements it can be interpreted that Turkish immigrants’ inability lies behind the fact that Turkey is geographically not in Europe, which is open to be discussed.

Other examples in the article provide stories about Turkish youth, who fail in school and have a tendency towards violation (pp.88-89). One can argue that a negative and conventional image of young Turkish immigrants is given in the article. They are depicted as people not caring about education, bound to their traditions, not able as well as not willing to integrate and as a group in the world of its own (Mora, 2009:125). To illustrate this one quotation from the article should be given:

„Du musst so hart wie möglich vorgehen, um in Ruhe gelassen zu werden“, sagt Ramazan, Mitglied einer türkischen Jugendgang in Berlin-Kreuzberg. Schlägereien gehören für ihn zum Alltag, in Messerstechereien war er schon oft verwickelt, und auch mit Schusswaffen versteht der 17jährige umzugehen. Seine Narben zeigt er wie Kriegsveteranen ihre Orden, viel mehr hat er nicht zu bieten (p.87).

The problem of drug traffic among young Turkish immigrants is also mentioned in the article (89). In that way the criminal attitudes of Turkish immigrants is featured. While Turkish immigrants are shown far away from education, they are also depicted as victims of patriarchal pressure as seen in the following quote:

In zahllosen Fällen werden die türkischen Kids Opfer traditioneller Familienstrukturen. Immer noch suchen häufig die Väter in türkischen Familien in der alten Heimat eine Ehepartnerin oder einen Ehepartner für ihr Kind aus. Viele der jungen, aus der Türkei eingeflogenen Ehefrauen können noch nicht einmal Türkisch schreiben. Nach einer Unesco-Statistik sind rund 27 Prozent der Frauen in der Türkei Analphabeten. Geschickt nutzen die Patriarchen die liberalen Regelungen zur Familienzusammenführung und schaffen so neue Familien, in denen Kinder als zweisprachige Analphabeten heranwachsen (91).

Thus, negative representations depicting the Turkish immigrants as backward are used here. A dominant Turkish father who always tells what to do, Turkish woman who is not even able to read and is not seen as an individual and the Turkish youth shown as analphabets in both languages are constructed features here. As mentioned before, for an argumentative support to the position of the report, so called experts about the subject are chosen by Spiegel to confirm their position on the introduced subject. In this context the theories and opinions from the Professor of Sociology, Wilhelm Heitmeyer are represented with his picture and his arguments approving the position of the magazine. To mention shortly Heitmeyer's study, in this survey among 1200 Turkish youth between the ages 16-21, he concluded that every fourth Turkish pupil is ready to kill for Islam (quoted after Santel, 1998). However, about the objectivity and relevance of his survey there exists hard criticism on account of the lack of academic evidence that is explained by Santel as:

So erschreckend die Resultate auf den ersten Blick anmuten, so sehr wecken verschiedene methodische und inhaltliche Mängel Zweifel. Nicht nur wird die Diskussion einschlägiger wissenschaftlicher Literatur verweigert, die Schlußfolgerungen stehen teilweise auch in offenem Widerspruch zu den erhobenen Daten. Viel wird behauptet, wenig bewiesen. Um etwa die These zu stützen, die dritte Generation setze den Integrationsprozeß ihrer Eltern nicht fort, verweisen die Autoren mehrfach auf "ältere Migrationsstudien aus den dreißiger und sechziger Jahren in den Vereinigten Staaten" (1998).

Another speculation by Farrokhzad about this style of the magazine is pointed out as: "Zur argumentativen Verstärkung der eigenen Position werden gern ‚Fachleute‘ herangezogen. Es handelt sich hierbei um Wissenschaftler/innen oder manchmal auch einfach vom Spiegel ernannte Expert(inn)en" (p.67).

As a result, the article wants to make clear that Germany has failed to become a multicultural country, or should give up trying to become one. It has been shown that the article emphasizes the cultural difference of Turkish immigrants and depicts them through their otherness, far away from integrating and as a possible threat for the German society.

3.4.4“Allah’s daughter without rights: Muslim women in Germany” (Allah’s rechtlose Töchter: Muslimische Frauen in Deutschland) 2004/47

Spiegel's title theme of the 14th of November in 2004 was “Allah’s daughter without rights: Muslim women in Germany”, which will be analyzed in this part of the study. The publication of *Spiegel* with this title theme was just nearly two weeks after the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Islamist fundamentalist on account of his film “Submission” that portrayed violence against Muslim women. This incident caused the focus of public interest on Islam like after 9/11 attacks in the United States of America. Directly after the 9/11 attacks, there was the attempt to ensure that Islamic terrorism should not be confused with Islam. In spite of that, developments in the international and domestic area have made the public increasingly obsessed with all issues related to Islam and especially with Muslims in Germany. Another aspect worth to mention is the fact that while at the beginning the focus was on security issues and the identification of ‘Islamic extremists’, the scope of the media’s investigation of German Muslims expanded widely. Thus according to Ramm, the key element of the growing obsession with Islam can be seen as a shifting focus from the foreigner or so called “Ausländer” towards the Muslim (2010). Besides the attacks in USA and the murder of the Dutch film maker, Saz explains how the prompting focus on Islam in the political area as well as in the media has emerged:

First and foremost we need to find an explanation for the recent rise in the fear against Islam in Europe. The rise of Islamophobia comes from a mixture of radical fundamentalist Islam, creeping out in the post 9-11 era, which created an environment of fear and angst by wars and combats against terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon and parts of Africa. Adding to the equation the nuclear threat in Iran, the Israel-Palestinian conflict of course all terrorist attacks after 9-11, especially the 2003 Istanbul bombings, 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings and the European contention about headscarves, the construction of mosques and the racial reactions on the so-called caricature conflict, further helped fuelling the Islamophobic stance in Europe (2011).

In this sense, the attitude of the media, especially after the 9/11 incident is criticized by Neumann as: “Gerade die Zeit nach dem 11. September 2001 hat wieder einmal gezeigt, wie oberflächlich zum Teil die Medienberichterstattung erfolgt und wie schnell Menschenbilder geformt und Klischees verbreitet werden können” (2002). All in all, these events with the influence of sensational media coverage shaped the picture of many Muslim immigrants and especially as the biggest Muslim minority group this had consequences for the Turkish immigrants in Germany, too. Ramm explains these consequences as:

The identification of immigrants as foreigners has been gradually replaced by their demarcation as the religious ‘Other’. In this process the image of Turkish immigrants is increasingly ‘Islamized’, thereby taking up and reshaping older discourses which focused on their ethnic and cultural ‘otherness’ as foreigners or on the vision of a second generation ‘caught’ between two cultures (2010).

Thus, it is not surprising that nearly all characters in this *Spiegel* article are young Turkish woman. It is also seen that we should be convinced from the religious attitude of the Turkish immigrants without questioning if they are also practicing their religion or have faith in their belief. As Farrokhzad mentions, nowadays there are rarely articles or reports in the mass media about Islam, where woman with headscarves are not seen, as it is in this *Spiegel* article (2006). The effect of the headscarf can be explained by Beck-Gernsheim as: “Das Kopftuch ist zum Symbol, Stichwort und Reizwort geworden, das Kontroversen auslöst, die Gemüter erhitzt und deutsche Gerichte beschäftigt“ (2004:59). Besides, the author also points out that in the perception of the public the headscarf is a symbol of pressure (Ibid), which is obviously the case in this article.

Illustrated the historical background of this article, the cover page¹⁶ of this *Spiegel* title theme can be examined. The cover picture shows a walking woman wearing black scarves covering her whole body with a countersunk head. An interpretation about this cover page is as follow:

Eine von Kopf bis zu Fuß Schwarz verhüllte Frau, als rechtlose Tochter Allahs beschrieben, schreitet anonym mit gesenktem Kopf und dem Blick nach unten gerichtet durch das Bild. Das Kopftuch, später als Flagge des islamistischen „Kreuzzuges“ beschrieben, dient als klare symbolische Markierung für die Unterdrückung der muslimischen Frau. Deren Zerrissenheit zwischen religiöser Tradition und westlicher Moderne wird durch das Tragen von hochhackigen Schuhen, einem Symbol für den Ausbruch aus den häuslichen Beschränkungen, bereits angedeutet. Die dominante Kleiderfarbe Schwarz steht, kulturell vergleichsweise klar codiert, in Westeuropa überwiegend für das Böse und für Bedrohung. (Wellgraf,2008:91)

According to Wellgraf, in the title page a journalistic altercation about the “Muslim woman in Germany” is promised and the reader is confronted with impressive negative examples given in four pieces, revealing the collective fate of predominantly Turkish woman in the country (2008:90). The article starts with the statement “Rules do not apply for us” (Für uns gelten keine Gesetze), upon which it is reported as following:

¹⁶ For the cover page see: Annex 6

Thousands of Muslim women live in Germany under the patriarchal yoke, locked up in their flats, helpless against violence and forced marriage, without any chance of integration they disappear in a parallel world dominated by fundamentalist domestic tyrants (quoted from Ramm, Spiegel 15.11.2004).

Directly next to these statements, a big picture, where five Muslim women are seen from the back, are shown on the “Münchener Fernsehturm”. They are looking behind the grits of the television tower to the city, as if they were in a prison, which underlies their oppression. Taking the stories of four Turkish women and telling their story through quotations from their interviews, they are shown as victims of pressure. In this way the statements of the magazine are confirmed, as their miserable life on account of so called patriarchates is revealed obviously. For instance the story of the 20 year old Yasemin, who escaped from her family, after she was treated as a slut by her family as she wore modern clothes like her German friends. Other examples are the stories of Ülkü, 26, who suffered from violence of her husband or Derya, 33, who was forced to marry her cousin from Turkey and Arzu, who had to be afflicted with the same problems.

Without asking if these Muslim women are actively religious or have faith in Islam, they are collectively categorized as “Allah’s daughters without rights”. Through this collective categorizing, contrary to Turkish women, according to Farrokhzad, it is indicated that in the dominant Western culture German women are emancipated individuals:

(...) Wenn beispielsweise immer wieder und fast ausschließlich darüber berichtet wird, dass muslimische Frauen aufgrund ihrer religiösen Zugehörigkeit in einem Klima von Angst, Gewalt und Unterdrückung leben, wird suggeriert, dass in der westlichen Dominanzkultur die Gleichberichtigung zwischen Geschlechtern hergestellt sei und deutsche Frauen als Angehörige der Dominanzkultur folglich quasi automatisch emanzipiert seien (2005:57)

Like Farrokhzad, Lüneborg et al found out that the quantitative dominant picture is the needy female victim and they explain this as: “Der immer wiederkehrende Bezug auf die ‘Kopftuchtürkin’ konstituiert und reproduziert die Andersartigkeit und Rückständigkeit von Migrantinnen und stellt sie in Gegensatz zu westlichen, aufgeklärten Frauen“ (2011:144). It is seen how through the headscarf the Turkish woman becomes the symbol for otherness in the German society. In this connection, the focus on the Turkish women in the German discourses is criticized by Broyles-Gonzales as:

(...) der deutsche Diskurs über türkische Frauen trägt Anzeichen von bemerkenswerter Nachlässigkeit; Spekulationen werden als Gewißheiten ausgegeben... Wenn es um türkische

Frauen geht, scheint man ohne intellektuelle Genauigkeit auskommen zu können; Annäherungen genügen (1990:111).

On the next two pages of the article three following pictures are seen, each of them indicating the message of otherness. The statement under the three pictures is: “A Muslim couple, a Turkish tea room, a Koran school: A life in subculture with own language, own infrastructure and own laws” (pp.62-63), displaying that Turkish immigrants live in a different world created by themselves in which they are ignorant to the German society.

Another issue in the article are the young Turkish “machos”, depicted with a patriarchal dominance that overpowers the Turkish woman:

Nobody cares that a new macho generation from the Bosphorus is increasingly dominating the typical districts: young men who were born here, idolized by their fathers as heroes and pampered by their mothers (...) Lans consider themselves cool and scratch themselves in the crotch of their Adidas track pants. And they are the rulers of women (quoted after Ramm, 2010, *Spiegel*:76).

As it is usual for *Spiegel*, so called expert opinions are included in the report as an addition to the depicted portraits, where Islam is criticized and shown as the concept of enemy as Wellgraf interprets it. In this interview part with a broad investigation of experts, exactly those politicians, scientists or almoner come to word, approving the given statement and eliminate all other perceptions and views (2008:95). Thus, the article includes interviews with the German feminist Alice Schwarzer and the Dutch writer Harry Mulisch. In this point it cannot be argued that *Spiegel* keeps a critical distance in the interview, but rather asks questions to get a confirmation of the already clear answer they want to get (Ibid).

Another heading is seen in the next pages, with the title “Lost Daughters” (Die verlorenen Töchter) and the stories of Turkish girls, who suffer under the pressure of their fathers is told in this part. In that way again all Turkish girls are generalized and represented as teenagers under patriarchal pressure and forced to marriage. It is explained in the article, that by opposing their traditions, the Turkish girls risk their lives. Either they are married to foreign villages in their homeland or obstructed or they break up, like the three Turkish girls, on whose stories the article focuses. In this context, it can be said that the argumentation of Lüneborg et al gets confirmed: “Als Exotinnen, Förderungsbedürftige oder Schutzbedürftige werden sie sichtbar. Damit bleibt die Dominanz der deutschen Mehrheitsgesellschaft unangetastet” (201:145). Also the opinion

of Pinn that Islam is usually depicted as negatively with regard to the effect on the family life and education and especially in the case of girls and women is approved in this way.

To give a deeper look inside the creation of this article, Wellgraf scrutinizes the *Spiegel* story and tries to find out how the article was written by interviewing one of the nine authors who wrote the article. So he comes to the conclusion that for the production of the *Spiegel* story each author is scheduled to research an aspect with religious motivated violence against Turkish woman in Germany, as the main argumentation of the story is already predetermined by *Spiegel* and the intended message is already clear before the authors of the article start to do their research (pp.94-95). In other words, the statement of the article is determined in the beginning instead of at the end of the research. Thus, the interpretations are not taken from the researched material, but rather the material for the article is collected to prove the statement as much as possible. Lastly, the commercial success of this *Spiegel* title theme, with a selling of 1,115.468, more than other *Spiegel* title themes, can be mentioned. In connection with the commercial concern of the media, with regard to the target group, Pinn criticizes that to fulfill their expectations, the concentration is usually on the peculiar appearance or on the “fundamentalist danger”, which has been seen in this article. Furthermore the author prompts one to ask himself how it would be if a Turkish newspaper would show a German or European woman with an illustrated picture of confirmands or at a Communion class with a comment “A silent ordeal” (1997). Finally it can be claimed that in this *Spiegel* article the “otherness” of Turkish immigrants is constructed on the base of its Islamic religion (Müfütler-Bac, 2007).

4. Turkey’s EU Accession Process and the Significance of the Public Opinion

In this part, firstly a short overview about Turkey’s EU story will be given, upon which the German public opinion about Turkey’s accession is going to be analyzed. Thereafter the significance of the public opinion will be examined with the reason of a possible referendum during the time when Turkey has fulfilled all conditions for the membership and is ready for the EU accession.

4.1 Turkey's EU Story

This part of the study aims to give a short overview about Turkey's bid for EU membership. It can be said that Turkey has the unique story of a never ending process of accession to the European Union. Casanova also states that Turkey has been patiently knocking on the door of the European club since 1959, only to be told politely to keep waiting, whereas latecomer after latecomer were invited first in successive waves of accession (2006). Politicians do not agree on a common position either, which makes the topic one of the most highly popularized issues within EU politics.

Since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has become one of the few pluralist secular democracies in the Muslim world. The country began to gear its political, economic and social reforms towards those of Western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since aligned itself closely by becoming a member of the UN, NATO, the OECD, the Council of Europe and as an associate member the Western European Union. Thus, Turkey's initial application for EU membership, which was at that time the "European Economic Community", dates back to 1959 where Turkey applied for associate membership. Consequently, the EEC and Ankara negotiated and signed the so-called Ankara Agreement in September 1963, which made Turkey an associate member of the Community and sought to establish a customs union. In 1970, the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement set a timeframe of twenty-two years for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods traded between Turkey and the EEC. However, the Additional Protocol was never fully implemented and after the military coup in Turkey in 1980, relations saw a temporary stop. So it was not until April 1987 when Turkey submitted its application for full ECC membership. Although the European Commission answered in December of 1989 by confirming eventual Turkish membership, it postponed the matter to a later point in time, referring to Turkey's unstable economic and political situation as well as to its poor relations with Greece and the conflict over Cyprus as an unfavorable basis and lack of point to start negotiations (Können, 2009). In 1995 the completion of the EU-Turkish customs union took place and became effective in 1996. Nevertheless the Luxemburg EU Summit in 1997 refused to award Turkey the status of a candidate state and excluded Turkey from the new candidate states even though some other states in East Central Europe and the Mediterranean earned the status for candidacy (Grigoriadis, 2006:148). It can be claimed that this brought the EU- Turkey relations to the lowest point (Eralp, 2002). However two years later in the Helsinki summit in 1999, Turkey was granted with the official candidate status. In 2002 at the EU-Copenhagen Summit it was seen that Turkey had made significant

processes in meeting the candidacy criteria faster than expected. In this context, Grigoriadis claims that the prospect of Turkey's accession to the EU led to the most significant political transformation Turkey had experienced since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1945 (2006:148). Though, in 2002 it was decided to postpone the decision on the commencement of EU-Turkey accession until the next EU Summit in 2004, where the European Commission reported that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and was therefore eligible for accession negotiations. Thus, after many years and efforts accession negotiations were opened on 3 October 2005 (Ibid). A problematic issue after the negotiations were opened was in 2006 because of a disagreement over the status of Cyprus. The Commission explains about this situation that on account of the Turkish failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the Council decided that eight relevant chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment. This can be seen as a big hindrance for Turkey if one considers that no process can be done in eight out of 35 chapters.

Another important issue, to mention shortly, that comes to the forefront in the EU-Turkey relations is the "privileged partnership". Opposition to the prospect of Turkey's full EU membership has been translated into support for an alternative mode of advanced EU-Turkey relations called "privileged partnership". The implication with the privileged partnership is that it would entail a closer strategic, political and economic relationship between the European Union and Turkey. Though, this would run short of full membership in such fields as freedom of movement for Turkish citizens and Turkey's access to EU structural funds and subsidies (Grigoriadis, 2006).

Having viewed the historical background of Turkey's bid for EU membership, today there are different views about the date of accession. To give an example, Können estimates that Turkey will probably not enter the EU before 2021 due to extensive reforms that still have to be carried out (2009). The current situation of Turkey's accession is summarized by Morelli as: "In general, concerns regarding immigration, jobs, domestic political reform, and uncertainties over its Muslim population have continued to cloud European attitudes about Turkey" (2011:3). Besides these, there are many views about the difficulties that Turkey has to face and get over to become an EU member, where issues like human rights or economical situation are some to mention. However, Erzan and Kirisci make attention to the point that amongst the many tough, contested issues that will mark the accession process will be immigration and integration (2008). Especially in Germany, as Barysch also

puts forward, issues of immigration and integration are a key ingredient of the debate about Turkish accession (2007:4).

Even if Turkey undergoes all the difficulties and becomes ready for the membership, besides the above mentioned issues, one crucial aspect towards Turkey's membership is expressed by Casonava as: "Indeed, the closer Turkey gets to meet the political conditions, the more the unstated cultural conditions of already belonging to European civilization tend to gain prominence in the debate" (2006). The author adds that the apparent fear of many Europeans is actually that Turkey may be ready to meet all the stated "modern" conditions (Ibid), and in this point the cultural difference of Turkey will become a focus point. In this sense, it should be pointed out that during the 1990s the EU underwent a considerably transformation through which the opinion that the Union should not only be seen as an intermediate stage towards development, but also the process of political and cultural elements should be facilitated to form the basis of a new inclusive European identity emerged. Thus, the intense debates about whether Turkey could be considered European especially after 1999, where it was granted with the status of candidate member, state can be understood (Grigoriadis, 2006 pp.147-148). Related to this, Guo explains that the fear that Turkey is not only seen 'non European,' but that it also threatens the EU's 'European' identity is a viewpoint that is held by both the public, as it will be revealed in the next part of the study, as well as the political elites of some EU member states (2009). The explanation of Müftüler-Baç and Taskın that "The Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity as opposed to Christian Europe have been crucial in shaping the minds of Europeans in conjunction with Turkish membership to the EU" (2007, 41) can be shown as one of the reasons providing a background for the debates about Turkey's identity without going into detail. In this sense, opponents of Turkey's accession put Turkey's cultural difference forward, like the two German historians Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich-August Winkler, who have defended the view that Turkey was not part of Europe in a geographical, historical and cultural sense, since Turkey did not go through the European stages of Reformation, Renaissance and Enlightenment (Witzens 2005:221)

All in all, even if Turkey removes all barriers, there is the possibility that the EU citizens will make the crucial decision if Turkey will be accepted as a member or not. Due to this, in the next part of the study it will be explained why the public opinion becomes so crucial for Turkey.

4.2 The significance of the Public Opinion about Turkey's EU Membership: Referendum

Before giving the public opinion of Germans about Turkey's accession into the EU, it should be enlightened why the public opinion is of importance. The significance of the public opinion about Turkey's accession to the EU lies behind the fact that if Turkey fulfils all the EU criteria and becomes ready for the membership, there is a possibility of a referendum in this time, where the public will decide on this matter. In such a scenario the public opinion will be of great importance, which is the prompting reason for this part of the study. Thus, Turkey can have problems on account of a negative public attitude towards the membership, which is going to be shown as the next step in the study. This assumption is expressed by Saz with the following scenario:

Granted that the EU will expand its absorption capacity and Turkey fulfils all political and economic criteria, Turkey might still be left out of the Union just because by the time being the ultimate decision on accepting Turkey as a new member will lie in the hands of the EU citizens (2011:488).

In this sense, it becomes obvious that the opinion of the EU citizens is considerably crucial for Turkey. Politicians from France and Austria that opposed to Turkish EU accession recently announced that they wanted to initiate referenda in their respective countries on the issue of Turkey's accession. It was announced by the French administration that in 2008 its intention is to amend the French Constitution in a way that would necessitate a referendum on enlargement if the country in question harbored more than 5% of the EU's total population, a requirement that would definitely affect Turkey. Not long after the French debate on a referendum on Turkey's membership, Austria announced its intention to initiate a referendum on the matter as well. During Austria's 2008 election campaign, the centrist coalition parties proclaimed their agreement on a national referendum if the accession talks in favor of Turkish membership. After the elections, these parties did not rule out the option to hold referenda on future EU treaties, which continues to make a referendum over Turkey possible (Können, 2009). Recently also several far-right European parties vowed to seek a European wide referendum on Turkey's accession, after the two day meeting in Vienna between the Austrian Freedom Party, Belgium's Flemish Interest Party, the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People's Party and others. It should also be kept in mind that after December 2009, where the Lisbon Treaty came into force, European citizens have more power on the decision making process. To be precise, the new treaty laid the groundwork for a so-called European Citizens' Initiative, which would require the European

Commission to give consideration to issues brought forth by petitions of one million European citizen signatures. In such a case, even if a referendum is not initiated, still EU citizens can oppose to Turkey's membership with petition.

However the referendum issue has remained rather symbolic until today, but will probably become a focus point when negotiations with Turkey are accelerated. As a result, if the referendum is initiated in the EU, the German public will also have a big influence on the results, which would be rather a negative one as it will be revealed in this study.

4.3 The German Public Opinion about Turkey's EU Membership

In this part of the study the public opinion of EU citizens, especially of the German public about Turkey's EU accession will be revealed by using the Eurobarometer reports of the European Commission. To start with, some information about the Eurobarometer (EB) reports should be given. The Eurobarometer reports are about the public opinion analysis sector of the European Commission. Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro and defense are some of the field researches. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Reports are published twice yearly. It should also be mentioned that the content of the reports is not always the same, thus not every report includes information about the public opinion in respect to Turkey's membership.

Starting with the current public attitude towards enlargement in general, in spring 2008, only 31% supported Turkey's membership, whereas 55% were against it and 14% do not know. Thus a clear opposition to Turkey's accession is seen (Eurobarometer 69).

The Standard Eurobarometer 63 of spring 2005 and report 66 of autumn 2006 will be used to show the public opinion of Germans about Turkey's EU accession. These reports give remarkable results about the public opinion about Turkey's EU membership. Eight statements in 2005 and nine statements in 2006 about Turkey's accession were given during the interviews by the Commission upon which people gave their opinions. The statements mentioned in this part are those related with the above explained depictions of Turk's "otherness".

In this context, starting with the statement “Turkey’s joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in EU”, it was approved by 63% of the EU 25 while the German public’s confirmation on this point is 71% and increases to 78% in the Eurobarometer 66 survey in autumn 2006. These results reflect the fear that Germany would suffer under a flood of Turkish immigrants, as it has been depicted in the examined *Spiegel* reporting. As McLaren argues, immigration related with a high level of a perceived threat seems to create a feeling of hostility towards Turkey’s membership (McLaren, 2007). Also Ramm adds that in the specific German context, one of the most significant lines of demarcation against Turkey and Turkish people is the migration issue. Many critics directly related the situation of the three million plus immigrants of Turkish origin living in Germany to Turkey’s EU candidacy (Ramm,2006). This fear is clearly reflected in the public opinion.

To the statement “Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography”, 51% of the German public agree to it, whereas 55% of the EU 25 supports this statement. An increase of 8% is also seen in this statement in autumn 2006, where Germans believe that Turkey partly belongs to Europe geographically. It can be argued that it is surprising that the public opinion on this statement becomes more positive in one year, whereas on the other statements it becomes obviously more negative.

Another remarkable outcome of the survey reveals Turkey’s non acceptance to the EU on account of its cultural background. The statement “The cultural differences between Turkey and EU member states are too significant to allow for this accession” was approved by 66% of Germans, while 54% of the EU 25 citizens shared this view in spring 2005. Moreover, in autumn 2006 it is revealed that there is a growth of 8% thus 74% of the German public believes that the cultural difference of Turkey is a hindrance for its accession into EU. This result shows how in the public perception Turkey and Turks are seen as culturally different and other, as they are mainly depicted in the printed media. It can also be argued that European stance towards a Turkish EU membership indicate that the perceived religious and cultural divide has arrived at the centre stage of the political debate within the EU (Gallup, 2009). Since the EU on an institutional level tries to be loyal to its motto “united in diversity”, the public opinion shows the exact opposite in many key member states, including Germany (Saz, 2011). The outcomes of the Eurobarometer 75 from spring 2011 should also be indicated here. This report of the Commission reveals some outcomes that can be commented as contradictory. To specify what is meant, it should be focused on the question “What does the EU mean personally to you?”, upon

which in the first rank for 45% it means freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU and where according to 20% EU means “cultural diversity”, which is in the 7th rank in the answers. In the survey from autumn 2010 there were even 23% of people for whom EU personally meant “cultural diversity”. Thus, it is not really comprehensible to understand the big opposition against Turkey’s membership with the reasoning that the cultural differences between Turkey and EU are too much, if EU also means cultural diversity. It can be claimed that this is also in conflict with the EU institution motto “united in diversity”. In this sense, in spring 2011, 11% of the EU citizens and 13% in autumn in 2010, a percentage which should not be underestimated, stated that EU personally means “loss of our cultural identity”.

Another statement where Germans clearly show their dislike towards Turkey’s accession is the statement: “Turkey’s accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values”. While the EU 25 countries support this idea with 41%, only 34 % of Germans share this view. It would be proper to add the result of another survey here. In the Flashbarometer 257 it was revealed that cultural and religious issues in the expansion of the EU were only considered to be the fourth significant aspect with 20% to 22% percent in ‘ordinary’ enlargements of the EU, whereas in the ‘extraordinary’ case of Turkey 39 % think that religion plays an important role. Also in the EB 69 in spring 2008, the public opinion of European citizens indicates that religion plays the last role in representing the European Union. Both the EU citizens in average as well as German public it is only 3% indicating religion as the best EU representing value. Thus, it is seen that in the case of Turkey, these opinions change and the cultural difference, including also religion, becomes a hindrance for the approval of the EU citizens towards accession. To mention shortly, in relation to these statements of the German public, one should not wonder to read in *Die Zeit* the following comments: “Overall in Europe Muslim minorities defy assimilation and retreat to their subcultures. It is well known that the Federal Republic of Germany does not have a problem with foreigners, it has a problem with the Turks alone” (Wehler,38,2002).

In respect of the public opinion of Turkey’s cultural difference including also religion, a survey also reveals 75% of the German public disagree with the statement that Islam is compatible with the Western culture (ESI 2008). Additionally Barysch explains more than 90 per cent of Germans believe that Islam is hostile and aggressive to women (2007:4), which has been revealed in the *Spiegel* reporting as well.

The interesting aspect here is that in all the above mentioned statements Germany's attitude towards Turkey's EU membership is definitely more negative than the average EU attitude. This can be explained with a good reason, which is explained by McLaren as: "(...) in countries where immigration from Turkey is high, citizens are most hostile to the Turkish candidacy" (McLaren 2007: 254), which will be explained in the next part of this study. Saz also shares this view by claiming that higher Turkish population share in the European host country corresponds to a higher disapproval rate of Turkish membership. The author also makes attention to the point that the public opinion in the core EU nations is mainly against Turkish membership, while the remaining EU periphery consisting of EEC nations is mainly for a Turkish membership (2010).

Besides all these arguments, a last outcome of the Special EB 255 from July 2007 should be given. In this special report about "Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement", it is seen that no matter how much efforts Turkey makes to fulfill the EU criteria, the public will still oppose in large extent to its accession. This is revealed with the answers to the question: "even if once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the EU, would you be in favor or opposed to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?", upon which 48% of EU citizens would oppose the membership and 39% would be in favor. However, in the case of the German public the opposition increases, where 69% would still be against Turkey's accession and only 27% would support it. This question was asked again in the EB 69 spring wave in 2008 and in the specific German context, an opposition of 63 % is seen, where 24% "fairly oppose" and 39% "oppose" Turkey's membership even if it complies with all conditions. Only 35% of the German public would favour under such circumstances the accession, where 12% "strongly support" and 23% "fairly support" the accession of the country.

Thus, it becomes obvious that, as Barchard's argues that the German society as a whole has a deeply unfavorable image of Turkey and Turks (2008:24). One can argue that the public opinion is actually in great importance for Turkey's membership. Besides the possible referendum, Verney claims that it seems likely that the negative public opinion will influence national decision makers, especially now that the elitist feature of the integration project has become clearly contested (2007).

4.4 The Linkage between the Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Public Opinion about Turkey's EU accession

As a last part of the study, after having examined how the public perception is created by the printed media by taking some *Spiegel* title themes as sample for the negative representation of Turkish immigrants, as a deeper media analysis is not in the scope of this study, and having illustrated the public opinion about Turkey's membership, the focus will be on the linkage between the perceived Turkey image through the Turkish immigrants in Germany and the public opinion about Turkey's EU membership, where a dominant opposition is seen. Turkey's otherness seems to be a constructed view in the mind of the public opinion creating the dislike of its accession. Culturally too different and fearing a flood of Turks in the case of an accession, it can be observed that the reflection of the reporting from the printed media is seen in the public opinion. In this sense Können also emphasizes that: "The link between populist politicians and Europhobic media adds up to a powerful symbiosis" and continues to explain why it is not to wonder that EU citizens are against Turkey's accession:

Furthermore, within most of the EU countries, citizens lack consistent and authentic information about Turkey in general and the potential benefits EU membership would imply for both sides. As there is no credible political debate held publicly about the issue (...), EU citizens often obtain a very adulterated picture of the whole matter left un-rectified by those in charge in the EU or the member states. It is hardly surprising that a lot of people do not approve or are actually afraid of Turkey being integrated into the EU, given the fact that they are constantly suggested that Turkey does not fit into the EU since it is "too different" or would unleash some kind of "clash of civilization" (2009).

In this point it is worth to touch upon the European and German view on immigrants in the general framework before skipping to the next part of the study to show the existence of a rather negative attitude towards them. With respect to this, the Eurobarometer 69 survey from spring 2008 on "Values of Europeans" will be used. This survey reveals that the statement "Immigrants contribute a lot to our society" was approved by 44 %, while 47% of the public opposed to this view in EU 27 average. It should also be mentioned that there are huge differences between the country's opinions. Coming to German public opinion, which is the focus point of this study, it comes out that above the EU 27 average 58% disagree with the statement and only 38% share the view that immigrants contribute to the country, while 4% have no opinion. Thus, it becomes obvious, that immigrants are not really welcomed in Germany and are not seen as a contribution to the country. Immigrants

are rather seen as problems and it is forgotten how much the German market and economy relies on the help of immigrants. It should also be reminded that in the post war economic boom Germany was contingent on the guest workers, who were seen as temporary immigrants, to develop its economy.

It can be argued that for the public opinion, the Turkish population in the European Union and especially in Germany is of great importance, since they represent Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey. On account of the high number of Turkish immigrants in Germany, domestic issues have dominated the debate on Turkey's EU membership in Germany (Mühlenhoff, 2010). Having seen that Turkish immigrants were depicted as 'other' from the German host society leading to their failed integration, the fear by the EU of facing a hard-to-integrate minority is expressed by Teitelbaum and Martin as:

Turkish guest workers and their families have had considerable difficulty integrating successfully into European societies. These problems have been widely recognized across Europe's political spectrum and are cause for further concern about Turkey's admission to the EU, as many European societies fear that additional Turkish migration will produce hard-to-integrate minorities that will threaten social peace and stability (2003:104).

Considering that the public opinion is considerably shaped by the media, in this point it can be claimed that the experience with Turkish immigrants perceived from the representation within printed media plays a role. Thus, the negative representation of Turks in Germany leads to the dislike of Turkey's membership within the German public. This view has also been put forward by many studies on which it will be focused here. For instance, Saz claims: "...that the negative feelings in the EU towards the EU membership of Turkey are indeed influenced by the negative experience with the European Turkish population" (2011:479). Also Kaya approves this with the argumentation that the perception of Turkey in Germany is constructed through the live styles, integration strategies or so called unwillingness of Turkish immigrants in the country (2009). Another support to this statement comes from Schaefer, who thinks that the opposition to Turkish membership can be linked to the perceived failed integration of the existing Turkish population in Germany (2005). Furthermore, the affect of the media in relation to Turkey's EU membership is made clear with the explanation of Barysch: "Much of the European media, meanwhile, is happy to trade in stereotypes, thus reinforcing public prejudices". Besides the media, Barysch adds that the widespread public hostility already affects Turkey's accession process, since it makes European politicians careful when speaking in favour of Turkey's membership (2007). In this context, Orendt also claims that one

explanation for the particular German rejection is the so called integration problems of many Turkish migrants. This issue is linked to the question how Turkey could succeed to integrate in the European Union if so many Turks fail to integrate in Germany. Grigoriadis supports this view by explaining: “ (...) the presence of large numbers of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, and the persistence of religious and cultural prejudices have contributed to the formation of a Turco-phobic European public opinion in many countries” (2006:157). Lastly, about the representation of Turks as the “other” through prejudices Kylstad argues: “The continued experience of Turkey as Europe’s other is therefore kept alive through interplay of representations of prejudice and actual experiences” (2010:8).

Lastly, about the religious aspect of Turkey it should be added that as Saz argues religion can be seen as a major stumbling block for Turkey on the quest for EU membership, since it is publically perceived as an Islamic country in Europe, despite its secular structure (2011). This is expressed by Casanova as: “But what makes ‘the immigrant question’ particularly thorny in Europe, and inextricably entwined with ‘the Turkish question,’ is the fact that in Europe immigration and Islam are almost synonymous”(2006:242). Similarly, according to Paul Taylor, Reuter’s European affairs editor, in the newspaper, Turkey as a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population gets edited to a ‘Muslim country’. Thus, it seen that there exist a consensus on the opinion that the representation of Turkish immigrants in Germany in the media leads to a dislike of Turkey’s EU membership in the public opinion.

CONCLUSION

The Turkish population in Germany is a remarkable big one, constituting the biggest minority group in Europe. With a population of approximately 3 million and the coming generation, it is obvious that they have become an indispensable dynamic of the country. However, it has been revealed that through the examination of four title themes from the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* that the German public is rather confronted with a negative representation of Turkish immigrants in the German printed media. In that way it has been shown that the negative and problematic representations of Turkish immigrants in some print media reinforce the public opinion to conclude that immigrants are sources of problems in society. Moreover, it has been seen that the problems of the immigrants are evaluated by the print media usually in relation to their ethnic and cultural status, as in the case of Turkish immigrants. Thus, one can argue that in the German media the concept of otherness is created. So, this study has attempted to reveal that the German perception towards a Turkish EU membership is in a great sense influenced by the relative share of the Turkish population in Germany, thus their representation in the printed media. In other words, it has been shown that the country image of Turkey is negatively influenced by the experience of the Turkish immigrants, considering the fact that this experience is mostly through the media. Another aspect that should be taken into consideration is that the current Turkish population in Germany is much different from the first generation of Turkish guest workers and one can not talk about a homogenous group.

To make these arguments understandable, Turkey's EU story has been indicated and the possible referendum in the time when Turkey's becomes ready for the membership has been explained to prove the significance of the public opinion. Than both the EU the public opinion in general and the German public opinion about Turkey's EU membership have been examined through the reports of the EU Commission, upon which it has been shown that there exists a remarkable opposition mainly on account of the cultural difference of Turkey and the fear of migration from the country, which reflect the contents of the reporting about Turkish immigrants. In this sense the linkage between Turkish immigrants and the dislike of the public opinion about Turkey's accession has been revealed as a last part of this study. Besides the representation of the Turkish immigrants in the media, through which they are perceived as a threat through all the warning reporting styles, one last aspect should be pointed out. As Saz reveals, the issue of integration is dealt under the responsibility of the ministry of interior in Germany (2011). Just recently Germany has in

some states a ministry solely for integration. In this sense, Ultsch argues that the treatment of integration in the ministry of interior signifies that the host country views its immigrants as a security issue and shows in that way the wrong feature of respect to other cultures (2010). So it is no wonder that Turkish immigrants are seen in the reporting as belonging to the 'other' culture and not able to integrate.

Lastly it can be argued that it is of great importance for Turkey to change the social image of its immigrants in Europe, especially in Germany, if it wants to change the European public opinion on a Turkish membership in the EU. In this point, it is obvious that the media plays a significant role. Turkey should not be perceived through the wrong depicted Turkish immigrants in Germany and the German public should make efforts to remove the misunderstandings that it gets through the media. As a final saying, Kyoydl's view on this can be given:

Deutschland und die Türkei – kaum zwei Länder sind vielfältiger und enger miteinander verbunden, ohne einander wirklich zu kennen und zu verstehen. Deutschland und die Türkei – das ist die Geschichte eines doppelten Missverständnisses (1997).

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
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ANNEX 1

DER SPIEGEL

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Gettos in Deutschland
**Eine Million
Türken**

SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit Außenminister Scheel
**„Das Bündnis
bröckelt nicht“**

ANNEX 2



ANNEX 3

TITEL

Weder Heimat noch Freunde

Nach dem mörderischen Brandanschlag auf Türken in Solingen ist die Stimmung im Land explosiv. Erstmals haben Ausländer nach rechtsextremistischem Terror

massiv und massenhaft zurückgeschlagen. Bonn geht international unter Druck. Mit einem neuen Ausländerrecht will die Union die Türken besser integrieren

Unter den Platanen am Kreuzberger Mariannenplatz schaukeln deutsche und türkische Frauen ihre Kinderwagen. Männer sonnen sich, unter dem Geklaff schwarzer Straßenhunde tollen Kinder auf dem Rasen. Ihr größter Hit zur Zeit: die neuen Glasmurmeln, die Nigâr Yeniöz in ihrem winzigen Laden für zehn Pfennig das Stück verkauft.

Wer nicht Marmeln, Patchwork-Dekken oder Röcke kaufen will, schaut auf ein Schwätzchen hinein. Immer wieder kommen junge Landsleute, um der Türkin Nigâr Yeniöz, 49, die Hand zu küssen, ein alter Brauch am zweiten Tag des sogenannten Opferfestes. Eigentlich sei das ein Tag der Freude, sagt die Moslemin Yeniöz, „wie Weihnachten bei den Christen“.

Am Donnerstag vergangener Woche war es anders. „Angst“, so Yeniöz, habe sie „nie gelernt“. Nun aber, „seit Solingen“, mustert sie die Menschen morgens, wenn sie am Berliner Landwehrkanal entlang zu ihrem Laden geht: „Ich schaue jedem ins Gesicht“, sagt sie, „und denke, ob der auch ein Mörder sein könnte.“ Als sie von den Morden in der nordrhein-westfälischen Stadt erfuhr, sagt sie, „wurde mir kalt“.

In der Nacht zum Pfingstsonntag hatten, so mutmaßten Ermittler, der Ausländerhasser Christian, 16, und einige Kumpane das Haus der Familie Genç angezündet. In den Flammen starben zwei Frauen und drei Mädchen: Gürsün Ince, 27, Hatice Genç, 18, Gülistan Öztürk, 12, Hülya Genç, 9, und Saima Genç, 4. Wie gelähmt sitzt Nigâr Yeniöz seither abends vor dem Fernseher, starrt auf die Bilder von der Ruine des Genç-Hauses, von den Politikern, die Betroffenheit bekunden, und den Krawallen.

Erstmals reagieren Ausländer auf rechte Gewalt mit massiver, massenhafter Gegengewalt. „Aus Wut wird Widerstand“, kündigen sie auf Transparenten an. Rund 400 Türken stürmen in der Nacht zum Pfingstmontag durch Solingen.

An den folgenden Tagen prügeln sich linke Kurden mit rechten türkischen Nationalisten, und beide attackieren die Polizei. Deutsche Autonomen mischen mit. Schaufenster splintern, der Sachschaden beträgt mehrere Millionen Mark.

Auch in anderen Städten wie Hamburg oder Bremen fliegen Pflastersteine. Wieder hat sich, wie nach dem Brandanschlag von Mölln vor gut sechs Monaten, die Republik verändert. Die Lichterketten wollten damals Millionen Deutsche sich und der Welt beweisen, daß rechtsextremer Haß im neuen



Moslemische Türken in Berlin, Anschlagziel in Solingen: „Alle Wurzeln verleugnen“

ANNEX 4



ANNEX 5

Zeitbomben in den Vorstädten

Die Ausländerintegration ist gescheitert. Überall im Land entsteht eine explosive Spannung. Bei jungen Türken und Aussiedlern, Randgruppen ohne Perspektive, wächst die Bereitschaft, sich mit Gewalt zu holen, was die Gesellschaft ihnen verweigert.



Türkisch-kurdische Gang in Berlin-Kreuzberg: „Die Jungs sind zu allem bereit“

Jeden letzten Freitag im Monat wird das Haus der Jugend im Hamburger Stadtteil Barmbek zur Festung. Etwa 30 Polizisten gehen mit Einsatzfahrzeugen in der Nähe des schäbigen Vorstadtbaus in Stellung. An der Eingangstür tasten drei Wachleute jeden Besucher ab, die Tanzfläche im ersten Stock wird von Beamten in Zivil überwacht. Anwohner, die nach dem Grund der Polizeipräsenz

fragen, erfahren knapp und lakonisch: „Russen-Disko“.

Die Ordnungshüter schützen rund 400 deutsche Jugendliche, die der Christliche Jugendsozialdienst zum Tanzvergnügen lädt – die meisten kommen aus Sibirien und Kasachstan und sprechen untereinander nur russisch.

Die Polizei gehört zum Party-service, seitdem sich die jungen Aussiedler im ver-

gangenen Sommer mit Türken eine Menschlagerie lieferten. Selbst wenn Musik nicht mehr spielt, bleiben die amten wachsam. Sie eskortieren die Jugendlichen zur S-Bahn, bis zum Hauptbahnhof patrouilliert der Bahnschutz verstärkter Besetzung durch die Wagg Für Klaus Fahrenkrog von der Polizeirektion Ost macht der Aufwand Sinn: kann hier jederzeit wieder knallen, da

ANNEX 6

DER SPIEGEL

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

None of the parts of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this university or any other institution.

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